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ABSTRACT
Intrusion Management Systems are being used to prevent the information systems
from successful intrusions and their consequences. They also have detection
features. They try to detect intrusions, which have passed the implemented
measures. Also the recovery of the system after a successful intrusion is made by the
Intrusion Management Systems. The investigation of the intrusion is made by
Intrusion Management Systems also. These functions can be existent in an intrusion
management system model, which has a four layers architecture. The layers of the
model are avoidance, assurance, detection and recovery. At the avoidance layer
necessary policies, standards and practices are implemented to prevent the
information system from successful intrusions. At the avoidance layer, the
effectiveness of implemented measures are measured by some test and reviews. At
the detection layer the identification of an intrusion or intrusion attempt is made in
the real time. The recovery layer is responsible from restoring the information
system after a successful intrusion. It has also functions to investigate the intrusion.
Intrusion Management Systems are used to protect information and computer assets
from intrusions. An organization aiming to protect its assets must use such a system.
After the implementation of the system, continuous reviews must be conducted in
order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures taken. Such a review can achieve
its goal by using principles and standards. In this thesis, the principles necessary to
implement a successful review program for Intrusion Management Systems have
been developed in the guidance of Generally Accepted System Security Principles
(GASSP). These example principles are developed for tools of each Intrusion
Management System layer. These tools are firewalls for avoidance layer,
vulnerability scanners for assurance layer, intrusion detection systems for detection
layer and integrity checkers for recovery layer of Intrusion Management Systems.
vÖZ
Nüfuz Yönetim Sistemleri, bilgi sistemlerini başarılı bir nüfuz olma olasılığından ve
bunarın sonuçlarından korumak için kullanılmaktadır. Ayrıca böyle bir nüfuzu tespit
etmek de bu sistemlerin özelliklerinden biridir. Uygulanan önlemleri geçen nüfuzlar
bu sistemlerce tespit edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Başarılı bir nüfuzdan sonra sistemi
iyileştirip eski konumuna getirmek ve mümkün olursa nüfuz ve nüfuz girişimlerini
soruşturmak da bu sistemlerin fonksiyonlarından biridir. Bu fonksiyonlar dört
katmanlı bir nüfuz yönetim sistemi modelinde bulunabilir. Bu katmanlar, önlem,
güvence, tespit ve iyileştirme katmanlarıdır. Önlem katmanında gerekli politika ve
standartlar geliştirilip, gerekli çalışmalar yapılarak bilgi sistemleri başarılı
nüfuzlardan korunmaktadır. Güvence katmanında ise, uygulanan önlemlerin
etkinliği yapılan test ve incelemeler ile ölçülmektedir. Tespit katmanı gerçek
zamanda oluşan nüfuz ve nüfuz girişimlerinin saptanmasından sorumludur.
İyileştirme katmanı ise başarılı bir nüfuzun sonucunda bilgi sisteminde ve bilginin
kendisinde oluşabilecek hasarların düzeltilmesinden ve sistemin eski güvenli
konumuna döndürülmesinden sorumludur. Ayrıca nüfuzun soruşturulması da bu
katmanda gerçekleştirilir.
Nüfuz Yönetim Sistemleri bilgi ve bilgi teknolojisi değerlerinin korunmasında
kullanılmaktadır. Değerlerini korumayı hedefleyen bir organizasyon böyle bir sistem
kullanmalıdır. Sistemin gerçekleştirilmesinden sonra ise alınan önlemlerin
etkinliğinin garanti edilmesi için devamlı bir inceleme gereklidir. Bu tip bir
inceleme hedefine prensip ve standartlar kullanarak ulaşabilir. Bu tezde, Nüfuz
Yönetim Sistemleri için başarılı bir güvenlik inceleme programı geliştirmek için
gerekli prensipleri Genel Olarak Kabul Edilmiş Sistem Güvenlik Prensipleri’nin yol
göstericiliği ortaya konmuştur. Nüfuz Yönetim Sistemleri’nin her katmanından
örnek araçlar için prensipler geliştirilmiştir. Bu araçlar; önlem katmanı için güvenlik
duvarları, güvence katmanı için zayıflık tarama araçları, tespit katmanı için Nüfuz
Tespit Sistemleri ve iyileştirme katmanı için bütünlük kontrolü araçlarıdır.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Computers and computer systems holds important information and data for people,
organizations and enterprises. This information should be protected and stored in a
secure environment without giving a chance to be modified, added or deleted by
unauthorized persons, users or attackers, which can be named as intruders. The efforts,
attacks and misuses of computers or computer systems to obtain classified information,
for theft or maybe just for pleasure are called as intrusion.
Some measures should be taken to avoid these intrusion to give harm to the system.
Combination of measures against these intrusions are called as Intrusion Management
Systems. The primary goal of intrusion management systems is to prevent the
consequences of intrusions entirely. Intrusion management is a four-layer process.
These four layers are avoidance, assurance, detection and recovery, with a sub-layer
investigation.
The first step in Intrusion Management process is avoidance. Avoidance includes all of
those underlying processes that seek to create a secure environment. All the intrusions
are tried to be prevented in this layer of Intrusion Management Systems. The second
step is assurance. Assurance includes everything done to ensure the policies, standards
and practices are being followed. Also the vulnerabilities of the system should be
checked in this layer. Also some intrusion tests to the information system should be
done in this layer. The third step is detection. In this layer the real time detection of an
intrusion attempt is very important. Knowing that an attack is in progress and being able
to take immediate action improves the chance of successfully terminating an intrusion
and the intruder. Real time detection depends upon having an audit system that sits in
the background and watches all the activities involving the device under surveillance.
The last step is recovery, with a sub-layer investigation. Intrusion management defaults
the recovery when al the other steps are failed to prevent the consequences of a
successful attack. Recovery requires the construction of  the system to the point where it
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is sure that the system have not been altered by the intruder. The data lost is between the
attack and the last backup. Investigation of security incidents, whether they are
successful or simply strong attempts, should be examined by the organizations’
Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRT). The CIRT should be trained and prepared
to initiate a formal investigation, present results to management, support litigation or
criminal prosecution if necessary, and ensure that lessons learned are fed back to the
Intrusion Management process.
Such a system should also be controlled and its security review should be made. While
doing this process some principles, standards and practices can be used. The primary
goal of this thesis is to develop some principles, that can be used in implementing such
a security review program for Intrusion Management Systems. In this thesis Generally
Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) have been used in order to develop some
principles for implementing a successful security review program for Intrusion
Management Systems.
The principles developed in this thesis are about firewalls; which take place in
avoidance layer of Intrusion Management systems, vulnerability scanners; which are in
assurance level of Intrusion Management Systems, Intrusion Detection Systems; which
are in detection layer of Intrusion Management Systems and integrity checkers; which
are in recovery layer of Intrusion Management Systems. Principles developed in this
thesis can be used by organizations’ security administrators in security review job of
their Intrusion Management Systems.
The Chapters of the thesis are formed as follows. In the second chapter of this thesis, a
background and overview about computer misuse techniques, Intrusion Management
Systems and finally about Generally Accepted System Security Principles is given. In
Chapter 3, the usage of GASSP principles in the implementation of security review
process are explained and new principles are developed. Also some examples of tools
have been explained and their qualifications are listed. In Chapter 4 a conclusion about
the principles have been made. Also a glossary for some terms used is included in the
appendix of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
In this chapter, an overview about techniques of computer misuses, Intrusion
Management Systems and finally about Generally Accepted System Security Principles
is presented.
2.1 Computer Misuse Techniques
Computer misuse can be described as, “The willful or negligent unauthorized activity
that affects the availability, confidentiality, or integrity of computer resources.
Computer abuse includes fraud, embezzlement, theft, malicious damage, unauthorized
use, denial of service, and misappropriation.” [1]. There are three types of basic gaps
that computer misuses can exploit [2]:
• “The technological gap between what a computer system is actually capable of
enforcing and what is expected to enforce (policies) This gap includes deficiencies in
both hardware and software as well as their administration, configuration and
operation.”
• “The sociotechnical gap between computer policies and social policies, such as
computer related crime laws, privacy laws and codes of ethics. When the computer
policies are not consistent with the socially expected norms this kind of gap can arise.”
• “The social gap between social policies and actual human behavior. This gap arises
when people do not act according to expectations.”
The attackers use these gaps in committing computer misuses. There are several types
of computer misuses techniques. We can group them in different classes. These
techniques can be classified as follows [2]:
• External Misuse - This class of misuse is generally non-technical and unobserved
and generally computers are not used in this type of misuses. If we should give an
example to this technique; collection of waste papers, remote observation of typed
keystrokes can be given. These techniques have no direct effects on the computer
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systems and cannot be detected by the computer security systems, but data that can be
captured by these means can be used in implementing other technological attacks.
• Hardware Misuse - There are two types of hardware misuse techniques. Passive and
active hardware misuse:
♦ Passive hardware misuse techniques have no immediate side effects on hardware
or software behavior. For example, eavesdropping and logical scavenging.
♦ Active hardware misuses have direct effects on computer systems. This type of
misuse includes computing equipment and storage media theft, hardware
modifications and physical attacks.
• Masquerading - These activities may be indistinguishable from legitimate activity.
Impersonation, playback and spoofing attacks, piggybacking on other users can be
examples of this type of attacks
• Setting up subsequent misuse - This class of misuses is planting and arming the
software Trojan horses with techniques of such as logic bombs, time bombs, malicious
worms and viruses. These programs may actually employ misuses of other classes
such as bypasses or misuse of authority.
• Bypassing intended controls - This class of misuse is circumvention of existing
controls or improper acquisition of otherwise denied authority, presumably with the
intent to subsequently misuse the acquired access rights.
• Active misuse of resources - This class of misuse is misuse of conferred authority
that alters the system or its data. For example, misuse of administrator privileges or
superuser privileges.
• Passive misuse of resources - This class includes misuse of conferred reading
authority, such as browsing (without specific target), searching (for specific patterns),
access to data aggregates that are more sensitive than the individual items and
exploitation of covert channels.
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• Misuse resulting from inaction - This class of misuse is a failure to avert a potential
problem in a timely fashion, or an error of omission, for example. This class might be
considered as a limiting case of passive misuse; however, it seems qualitatively
different and thus is distinguished as a separate class. Intentional misuse would result
from someone detecting but not reporting a serious security flaw.
• Use as an aid to other misuses - This class has two kinds;
♦ As a tool in planning, developing, controlling, or carrying out computer-system
misuse, such as seeking matches in the encrypted password file by preencrypting
dictionaries and likely passwords. Activities of this subclass may subsequently lead
to other computer misuse classes. This activities could be aimed at attacking a
computer system other than the one on which the indirect misuse is carried out. This
activities may seem suspicious, but is not necessarily yet an overt abuse.
♦ As a tool in planning, developing, controlling, or engaging in criminal enterprise
(e.g., managing an illegal drug business, or committing financial fraud), or
performing unethical acts (e.g., misuse of company resources for private purposes).
Also a distinction between abuse and misuse must be made, using abuse to refer to
intentional acts, and misuse to refer more generally to accidental or intentional act. The
classification addresses both intentional abuses of computers and corresponding
accidental misuses, primarily from the vantage point of security; however, we note that
there are other accidental forms of misuse that are not represented here.
One person can do most of the abuses above, but also there are misuses that many
people collaborate in omitting them. This type of misuses can be named as
collaborative misuses. And if the target computer system uses compartmentation and
multi-person authorizations collaborative misuses can be a necessity. For example
successful Trojan horses may require the unwitting collaboration of victims, but the
abuse by only one person.
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2.2 Intrusion Management Systems
Intrusion can be described as, “Any set of actions that attempt to compromise the
integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource” [1]. As the scale of networks
grows, the protection of assets from compromise, misuse, damage or destruction
become harder and harder. So a new model of information protection must be
developed, because the traditional protection measures, such as access controls, became
insufficient to protect the assets. The objectives of such an Information Protection
Model can be stated as stated below [3]:
An acceptable information protection model should accomplish three broad goals [3]:
• It should accommodate mechanisms that protect information assets from
compromise, abuse, damage or destruction.
• It should recognize that compromise is inevitable and that measures must be taken in
advance of to compromise to facilitate a means for recovery.
• The model should provide feedback that can speed response to a compromise and
generate information that can be used to prevent similar compromises in the future. It
is implicit in such a model that recovery is of greater urgency than prosecution.
The requirements of this kind of model are [3]:
• Information security architecture should strive to protect information assets from
compromise, abuse, destruction or damage. This is the primary objective of
information security in general.
• Some form of quality assurance must be present to verify that the actions taken by
components of the first requirement were effective and sufficient to the overall task.
• The model must take into account that intrusion attempts would occur and that some
percentage, depending upon the effectiveness of the implementations of the first two
requirements, would succeed. The model must provide for the detection  attempt and
forensic collection and management of appropriate evidence.
• Proceeding from the third requirement, the organization must be in a position to
pursue the investigation of intrusion attempts and act upon the evidence in accordance
their local policies. Because investigative motives differ (pursuing the perpetrator,
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recovering from the attack, responding to insurance requirements are just a few) the
requirements for the investigation layer may differ from instance to instance.
In addition to the four basic requirements, there must be a system of feedback loops that
allow the various capabilities of an architecture implemented under the model interact.
The resulting model, stated as Intrusion Management, has the following stated purpose
[4]:
“Limiting the possibility of a successful intrusion through effective
preventive, quality management and detective processes, and
facilitating successful investigation of an intrusion or an intrusion
attempt should either occur.”
This goal can be addressed by implementing effective security controls. These controls
must aim the vulnerabilities of the system. There are six functional areas of
vulnerability. These are [4]:
• Identification and Authentication: Functions intended to establish and verify the
identity of the user or using process.
• Access Control: Functions intended to control the flow of data between, and the use
of resources by users, processes and objects. This includes administration and
verification of access rights.
• Accountability: Functions intended to record exercising of rights to perform security-
relevant actions.
• Object Reuse: Functions intended to control reuse or scavenging of data objects.
• Accuracy: Functions intended to insure correctness and consistency of security-
relevant information.
• Reliability of Service: Functions intended to insure security of data over
communication links.
To address the goal of preventing intrusions, an intrusion management system should
have a four layer architecture. These layers are [3]:
• Avoidance Layer
• Assurance Layer
• Detection Layer
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• Recovery Layer (with the Investigation Sublayer)
2.2.1 Layers of Intrusion Management Systems
The Intrusion Management model consists of four layers one sublayer and feedback
loops. The feedback loops provide action mechanisms between the various levels of the
model. For example, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) implemented in layer 3
(Detection) has a feedback loop to layer 1 (Avoidance) which allows for notification
that an event is occurring and triggers the appropriate response to avoid the
consequences of the event. An IDS that did not implement such a feedback loop would
not meet the requirements of the model. The four layers of the model are defined as
follows [3]:
2.2.1.1 Layer 1 - Avoidance
The first step in Intrusion Management process is avoidance. Avoidance is defined as
all of those underlying processes implemented to create a secure environment. Those
processes may be administrative, as in policies, standards and practices, or they may be
technological as in the application of access control tools. Some examples of Avoidance
are [3]:
• Security policy
• Standards and practices
• Security Awareness
• Incident response planning
• Disaster planning
• Training of security and IT Audit personnel
• Evaluating the results of a successful intrusion (“ lessons learned” feedback)
• Implementation of access control programs
• Implementation of firewalls
• Implementation of encryption
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2.2.1.2 Layer 2 – Assurance
The second step is assurance. Assurance is defined as everything done to ensure that
policies, standards, practices and technological controls are effective. These processes
include [3]:
• IT audits
• Intrusion or penetration testing
• Vulnerability assessments
• Security reviews
Using appropriate tools, we can test our systems for vulnerabilities and, through proper
configuration or use of third party products, we can ensure that appropriate steps are
taken to reduce or eliminate them. Tools that we should use are of two types:
preventative and detective.
Preventative tools include those that we use to perform initial evaluation and
configuration. Detective tools are intended to ensure that any change of the
configuration is detected.
2.2.1.3 Layer 3 – Detection
The third step is detection. “Detection, as used here, is somewhat different from the
detective controls present during the avoidance and testing steps. In this case Detection
is defined as measures used to detect an intrusion or abuse attempt in real time. The real
time aspect of detection is important: knowing that an attack is in progress and being
able to take immediate action greatly improves the odds of successfully terminating the
intrusion and apprehending the perpetrator” [3].
Real time detection depends upon having a "watch dog" system that sits in the
background and watches all activities involving the device under surveillance. The
watch dog also must be able to interpret what constitutes an attack. The watch dog
should be able to detect abuse attempts both on communications channels and at the
device itself. It should comprise both network and device based surveillance.
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Critical components of the Detection level are the ability to collect forensically pristine
data that will help us to investigate and prosecute the perpetrator of an intrusion or
intrusion attempt, the ability to preserve that data from alteration and the ability to
trigger appropriate response actions.
2.2.1.4 Layer 4 - Recovery and Investigation
The fourth step is recovery. “Intrusion Management defaults to Recovery when all
other measures have failed to prevent the consequences of a successful attack. After the
recovery layer, there is an investigation sub-layer, in this sub-layer the traces of the
intrusion are investigated and the intruder is tried to be catch.” [3]
2.2.1.4.1 Recovery Layer
Recovery requires that we reconstruct the victim machine to the point where we can
state with confidence that we are not encroaching on information (configuration or
otherwise) that may have been altered by the intruder. Often this means losing data that
was generated in the “delta” between the time of the attack and the time of the last valid
backup. For this reason we may move into the sub-layer of Investigation in order to use
forensic techniques to recover the system.
2.2.1.4.2 Sublayer – Investigation
If it is the intent of the system owner to pursue a formal investigation aimed at
identifying the perpetrator of an attack, the Investigation sub-layer of recovery comes
into play. However, investigation, as you may have already gathered, may be futile
unless luck and circumstances are with you. By integrating your investigation process
into the intrusion management methodology you improve your odds markedly because
you have gathered significant important information and made critical preparations
along the way.
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The Investigation sub-layer is defined as those processes used to determine the source
and nature of an intrusion or abuse attempt, to gather, preserve and manage evidence
relating to the attempt, and to institute appropriate action as defined by local policy.
2.2.1.5 Feedback and Service Loops
The concept of feedback and service loops is one of the distinguishing factors of the
Intrusion Management model. This concept recognizes that the individual layers of the
Model do not operate in isolation. Feedback loops offer a method of providing
information from one layer to a lower layer, while service loops provide services from
one layer to a higher layer. For example there is an important feedback loop to layer 1
(Avoidance) from layer 4 (Recovery). This feedback loop consists of lessons learned in
the investigation of an abuse attempt. Presumably, those lessons will contribute to
avoiding the consequences of a similar attack later.
There are, of course, other feedback and service loops within the Model. Some of these
involve Layer 3 (Detection). There is a service loop from Assurance to Detection. When
we perform vulnerability assessments, we use intrusion detection systems to monitor
our tests. We can extend that service loop from Detection to the Investigation sub-layer.
The patterns recognized by our intrusion detection system are important in interpreting
logs in an incident investigation.
A feedback loop exists between Avoidance to Detection. When an intrusion detection
system (more correctly, intrusion detection and response system) detects an abuse
attempt, it has, depending upon local policy, several response options. One of those
options may be to terminate the socket. Terminating a socket with an intruder is, clearly,
an avoidance measure.
2.3 Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP)
Formation of the I2SF-sponsored GASSP Committee (GASSPC) began in mid-1992 in
response to Recommendation #1 of the report "Computers at Risk" (CAR), published by
the United States of America's National Research Council in 1990. That
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recommendation, "To Promulgate Comprehensive Generally Accepted System Security
Principles," and its subordinate elements sparked the genesis of a concerted effort to
establish a well-balanced committee population representing key elements of the private
and public sectors from both the USA and abroad.
Both administrative and product-related principles are being addressed, individual and
organizational privacy rights are being addressed, and, to consolidate all the elements of
a rapidly evolving industry, alliances are being established to the International
Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2, the international
Common Criteria effort to develop information technology product-related information
security principles, and other organizations having an interest in the security of
information and associated principles.
In order to effectively consolidate and sustain the value of comprehensive GASSP, the
CAR recommendation envisions the creation of an authoritative infrastructure to
maintain the GASSP, support their evolution, enforce "compliance", and provide a
vehicle for the authoritative approval of reasonably founded exceptions or departures
from GASSP.  This authoritative infrastructure would be modeled after those that
support and sustain the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and like
models of the international accounting profession.
The GASSP Committee kickoff meeting was held at the 1992 National Computer
Security Conference in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, and was attended by twenty-five
leading information security experts from the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the European Commission (EC).  Many differing
perspectives and agendas were discussed in an open exchange, but at the close of the
meeting, it was the consensus that the objectives were important, necessary, and,
perhaps most significant, achievable.
2.3.1 Definition
Information security is a combination of preventive, detective, and recovery measures.
A preventive measure is a risk control that avoids or deters the occurrence of an
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undesirable event.  Passwords, keycards, badges, contingency plans, policies, firewalls,
and encryption are examples of preventive measures.  A detective measure is a risk
control that identifies the occurrence of an undesirable event.  Visitor logs, audit trails,
motion sensors, closed circuit TV, and security reviews are examples of detective
controls.  Detective measures also provide a means for reporting the occurrence of
events.  A recovery measure is a risk control that restores the integrity, availability, and
confidentiality of information assets to their expected state.  Examples of recovery
measures are fault tolerance, backup, and disaster recovery plans.
Information Security also includes education, awareness, and training measures that
inform computer users of the “acceptable use” principles and practices that support the
protection of information assets.  The introduction of GASSP supports and strengthens
these controls.  These principles should be constructed to ensure that the information
system reduces the possibility of a risk event and its impact.
2.3.2 Purpose, Scope and Objectives
The GASSP Committee seeks to develop and maintain GASSP with guidance from
information owners, information security practitioners, information technology product
developers, and organizations having extensive experience in defining and stating the
principles of information security. The GASSP Committee seeks the creation,
maintenance, monitoring of, and adherence to the GASSP for information security in
the broadest context, on an international level, unifying and expanding upon existing
authoritative sources [5].
The objectives of GASSP Committee in forming the Generally Accepted System
Security Principles are [5]:
• “Identify and develop Pervasive, Broad Functional, and Detailed GASSP and
protection profiles in a comprehensive framework of emergent principles, standards,
conventions, and mechanisms that will preserve the availability, confidentiality, and
integrity of information.”
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• “Be an authoritative source for opinions, practices, and principles for information
owners, information security practitioners, information technology products, and
information systems.”
• “Define, implement, and subsequently operate under the governing GASSP
infrastructure.”
• “Define and establish linkage to the Common Criteria Project.”
• “Maintain close liaison and coordination with other international authoritative bodies
that have developed related works, to establish and maintain GASSP based on these
efforts.”
• “Define and establish liaison with bodies responsible for certifying professionals to
encourage convergence.”
• “Promote broad awareness of information security and GASSP.”
• “GASSP will address management, user, and other interested parties’ concerns at all
levels to gain the broadest acceptance.”
2.3.3 Principles
There are three kinds of Generally Accepted System security Principles and they are
organized in a three-level hierarchy.  The hierarchy is comprised of Pervasive Principles
(PP), Broad Functional Principles (BFP) and Detailed Security Principles (DSP). The
hierarchy goes from the fundamental one to detailed one.
2.3.3.1 Pervasive Principles
Pervasive principles are few in number, fundamental in nature, and rarely changing. The
Pervasive Principles address the following properties of information [5]:
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
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The Pervasive Principles provide general guidance to establish and maintain the security
of information.  These principles form the basis of Broad Functional Principles and
Detailed Principles.  Security of information is achieved through the preservation of
appropriate confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  Confidentiality is the
characteristic of information being disclosed only to authorized persons, entities, and
processes at authorized times and in the authorized manner.  Integrity is the
characteristic of information being accurate and complete and the information systems’
preservation of accuracy and completeness.  Availability is the characteristic of
information and supporting information systems being accessible and usable on a timely
basis in the required manner.
The Pervasive Principles are founded on the Guidelines for Security of Information
Systems, developed by the Information Computer and Communications Policy (ICCP)
Committee and endorsed and published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD).
The OECD principles have been interpreted and extended using the Authoritative
Foundation, a list of fundamental works on information security compiled by the
GASSP Committee to support the development of GASSP.
The list and explanations of pervasive principles are as follows [5]:
• Accountability Principle (PP-1) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated
as, “Information security accountability and responsibility must be clearly defined and
acknowledged.”[5] Accountability characterizes the ability to audit the actions of all
parties and processes, which interact with information.  Roles and responsibilities are
clearly defined, identified, and authorized at a level commensurate with the sensitivity
and criticality of information.  The relationship between all parties, processes, and
information must be clearly defined, documented, and acknowledged by all parties.
All parties must have responsibilities for which they are held accountable.
• Awareness Principle (PP-2) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“All parties, including but not limited to information owners and information security
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practitioners, with a need to know should have access to applied or available
principles, standards, conventions, or mechanisms for the security of information and
information systems, and should be informed of applicable threats to the security of
information.” [5] This principle applies between and within organizations.  Awareness
of information security principles, standards, conventions, and mechanisms enhances
and enables controls and can help to mitigate threats.  Awareness of threats and their
significance also increases user acceptance of controls.  Without user  awareness of the
necessity for particular controls, the users can pose a risk to information by ignoring,
bypassing, or overcoming existing control mechanisms.  The awareness principle
applies to unauthorized and authorized parties.
• Ethics Principle (PP-3) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“Information should be used, and the administration of information security should be
executed in an ethical manner.” [5] Information systems pervade our societies and
cultures. Rules and expectations are evolving with regard to the appropriate provision
and use of information systems and the security of information.  Use of information
and information systems should match the expectations established by social norms,
and obligations.
• Multidisciplinary Principle (PP-4) -The GASSP statement for this principle is
stated as, “Principles, standards, conventions, and mechanisms for the security of
information and information systems should address the considerations and viewpoints
of all interested parties.” [5] Information security is achieved by the combined efforts
of information owners, users, custodians, and information security personnel.
Decisions made with due consideration of all relevant viewpoints and technical
capabilities can enhance information security and receive better acceptance.
• Proportionality Principle (PP-5) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated
as, “Information security controls should be proportionate to the risks of modification,
denial of use, or disclosure of the information.” [5] Security controls should be
commensurate with the value of the information assets and the vulnerability.  Consider
the value, sensitivity and criticality of the information, and the probability, frequency
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and severity of direct and indirect harm or loss.  This principle recognizes the value of
approaches to information security ranging from prevention to acceptance.
• Integration Principle (PP-6) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“Principles, standards, conventions, and mechanisms for the security of information
should be coordinated and integrated with each other and with the organization's
policies and procedures to create and maintain security throughout an information
system.” [5] Many breaches of information security involve the compromise of more
than one safeguard.  The most effective control measures are components of an
integrated system of controls.  Information security is most efficient when planned,
managed and coordinated throughout the organization’s system of controls and the life
of the information.
• Timeliness Principle (PP-7) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“All accountable parties should act in a timely, coordinated manner to prevent or
respond to breaches of and threats to the security of information and information
systems.” [5] Organizations should be capable of swift coordination and action to
enable threat event prevention or mitigation.  This principle recognizes the need for
the public and private sectors to jointly establish mechanisms and procedures for rapid
and effective threat event reporting and handling.  Access to threat event history could
support effective response to threat events and may help to prevent future incidents.
• Assessment Principle (PP-8) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“The risks to information and information systems should be assessed periodically.”
[5] Information and the requirements for its security vary over time. Risks to the
information; its value; and the probability, frequency, and severity of direct and
indirect harm/loss should undergo periodic assessment.  Periodic assessment identifies
and measures the variances from available and established security measures and
controls, such as those articulated here in the GASSP, and the risk associated with
such variances.  Periodic assessment enables accountable parties to make informed,
information risk management decisions whether to accept, mitigate, or transfer the
identified risks with due consideration of cost effectiveness.
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• Equity Principle (PP-9) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“Management shall respect the rights and dignity of individuals when setting policy
and when selecting, implementing, and enforcing security measures.” [5] Information
security measures implemented by an organization should not infringe upon the
obligations, rights, and needs of legitimate users, owners, and others affected by the
information when exercised within the legitimate parameters of the mission objectives.
2.3.3.2 Broad Functional Principles
Broad Functional Principles are subordinate to one or more of the Pervasive Principles,
are more numerous and specific, guide the development of more Detailed Principles,
and change only when reflecting major developments in technology or other affecting
issues.
The Broad Functional Principles (BFPs) are derived from the Pervasive Principles (PP)
that represent the conceptual goals of information security.  By providing the guidance
for operational accomplishment of the Pervasive Principles, the Broad Functional
Principles are the building blocks (what to do) that comprise the Pervasive Principles
and allow definition of the basic units of those principles.  Because the Broad
Functional Principles are smaller in scope, they are easier to address in terms of
implementation planning and execution.
The list and explanations of broad functional principles are as follows [5]:
• Information Security Policy (BFP-1) - The GASSP statement for this principle is
stated as, “Management shall ensure that policy and supporting standards, baselines,
procedures, and guidelines are developed and maintained to address all aspects of
information security.  Such guidance must assign responsibility, the level of discretion,
and how much risk each individual or organizational entity is authorized to assume.”
[5] In order to assure that Information assets are effectively and uniformly secured
consistent with their value and associated risk factors, management must clearly
articulate its security strategy and associated expectations.  In the absence of this
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clarity, some resources will be under-secured - that is, ineffective; other resources will
be over-secured - that is, inefficient.
• Education and Awareness (BFP-2) - The GASSP statement for this principle is
stated as, “Management shall communicate information security policy to all
personnel and ensure that all are appropriately aware.  Education shall include
standards, baselines, procedures, guidelines, responsibilities, related enforcement
measures, and consequences of failure to comply.” [5] In order to ensure that all
personnel are effectively aware of security policy, management must effectively and
regularly communicate its requirements. When personnel fail to do what management
expects, it is more often the result of an ineffective or imperfect communication of
what management expects, rather than from the result of wrongful motive or intent on
the part of the personnel.  The failure to regularly and effectively communicate
information security policy, standards, baselines, procedures, guidelines,
responsibilities, related enforcement measures, and the consequences of failing to
comply, to all relevant parties can cause the unintentional breach of policy by parties
to whom the policy has not been effectively communicated.  Such failure can also
result in the intentional breach of policy by parties to whom the adverse consequences
of such a breach have not been effectively communicated. In both cases, the potential
for harm, liability, or loss to the organization or other relevant parties can be
significant.  The failure to effectively communicate information security policy can
also impair the ability to successfully apply enforcement measures, prosecute criminal
activity, or seek civil redress.
• Accountability (BFP-3) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“Management shall hold all parties accountable for their access to and use of
information, e.g., additions, modifications, copying and deletions, and supporting
Information Technology resources.  It must be possible to affix the date, time, and
responsibility, to the level of an individual, for all significant events.” [5] In order to
assure that people behave as expected, it is necessary to know who did what and when
it was done. It is essential that organizations establish and maintain a basis of control
for information assets.   Such a control framework requires individual and
organizational accountability at all levels.  The concept of "accountability" refers to
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the accepting of responsibility by all relevant parties or entities. Holding all parties
accountable is intended to assure that any use made of or actions taken on information
assets and supporting Information Technology resources shall be for authorized
"business/mission purposes only" and that such use or action can be reliably traced to
the responsible party or parties, who will be held "accountable."
• Information Management (BFP-4) - The GASSP statement for this principle is
stated as, “Management shall routinely catalog and value information assets, and
assign levels of sensitivity and criticality.  Information, as an asset, must be uniquely
identified and responsibility for it assigned.”[5] In order to manage information assets
efficiently, management must know what to protect.  In order to be effectively
managed, it is essential to identify and enumerate the core attributes of information as
assets.  The organizational ownership of an information asset must be established. The
person or agent/custodian legitimately established as the owner of an information asset
has the authority and responsibility to make - or delegate - decisions regarding the
security of the information asset.  It is typically the organization that will ultimately
suffer liability, loss, or other harm if the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of the
information asset is compromised, though others may suffer harm or loss as well. The
identity and content of the information asset must be clearly established for the owner
to make informed decisions regarding its security.  Knowing the value of the
information asset, as related to its confidentiality, availability, and integrity, enables
the owner to understand the financial risks and associated threats that must be
mitigated when establishing security requirements for the information asset. Finally,
these attributes should be reviewed regularly, because most information attributes
change value over time - in some cases increasing and in others, decreasing.
• Environmental Management (BFP-5) - The GASSP statement for this principle is
stated as, “Management shall consider and compensate for the risks inherent to the
internal and external physical environment where information assets and supporting
Information Technology resources and assets are stored, transmitted, or used.” [5] In
order to effectively protect the organizational mission, it is necessary to identify and
address environmental threats that can disrupt Information Technology functionality.
There are significant threats - and vulnerabilities - associated with the location,
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construction, and equipping of Information Technology facilities. These threats
include: Natural disaster threats (earthquake, flood, hurricane, tornado, landslides,
etc.), and unintentional or intentional physical threats (e.g., power outage, equipment
failure, fire, proximity of potentially toxic or explosive industrial facilities and
transportation infrastructures, local crime, and a wide array of accidents that could
“exploit” unrecognized or inadequately addressed vulnerabilities of the physical
environment.). For the optimum security strategy implementation, it is essential to
coordinate and integrate information security efforts with overall organizational
security measures and management. Failure to recognize and effectively address local
threats and associated vulnerabilities, both internal and external, can result in a
potentially disastrous disruption of Information Technology functionality.
• Personnel Qualifications (BFP-6) - The GASSP statement for this principle is
stated as, “Management shall establish and verify the qualifications related to
integrity, need-to- know, and technical competence of all parties provided access to
information assets or supporting Information Technology resources.” [5] In order to
effectively implement security for information assets and supporting Information
Technology resources, it is necessary that the personnel involved are competent with
respect to the knowledge and technical skill needed to perform their roles reliably, that
their integrity (as demonstrated by work history, academic and training certification,
and references) meets organizational requirements, and that their need-to-know is
authoritatively established
• System Integrity (BFP-7) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“Management shall ensure that all properties of systems and applications that are
essential to or relied upon to support the organization’s mission are established,
preserved, and safeguarded.” [4] In order for Management to be able to rely upon the
correct performance of Information Technology resources, it is necessary to ensure
that they are implemented as intended and are not subsequently contaminated or
corrupted by malicious acts, uncorrected error conditions, or other failures.  Unless
controls are in place to protect systems and applications from unauthorized
modifications and to ensure that authorized changes are tracked and perform as
intended, systems can fail in a way that impairs efficiency or even the health of the
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organization. Further, such failures may not be detected on a timely basis, because
management assumes the integrity of the Information Technology resources.
• Information Systems Life Cycle (BFP-8) - The GASSP statement for this principle
is stated as, “Management shall ensure that security is addressed at all stages of the
system life cycle.” [5] In order for management to be able to rely upon controls, they
must be continuous.  In order to be efficient, controls must be comprehensive and
applied early. The security function must be fully integrated with system life cycle
processes.  Retrofit, repair, and other late remedies are always inefficient and may be
ineffective.  Late application of a control may be insufficient to restore a system to a
desired or required robustness. All in-place controls and countermeasures must be
fully documented and periodically reviewed. For pre-production systems, phase
reviews must assess intended security feature design, integration, and effectiveness.
For in-production systems, maintenance phase reviews must be performed at every
step to ensure consistent and correct performance, continued effectiveness and
efficiency, accurate interface(s) with other applications, and the comprehensive
maintenance of all contingency planning measures. All reviews must be conducted in
conformance with established guidelines that define minimum acceptable
requirements for controls’ effectiveness in support of organizational standards for
information confidentiality, system and data integrity, and the availability of the
information asset and supporting Information Technology resources.
• Access Control (BFP-9) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“Management shall establish appropriate controls to balance access to information
assets and supporting Information Technology resources against the risk.” [5] In order
to achieve a level of risk mitigation commensurate with the value of the information
asset to be secured, access to information assets and supporting Information
Technology resources should be restricted to the smallest population consistent with
other business needs, based on the criteria of a clearly delineated "need-to-know."
Through this standard, the information systems-dependent workforce is facilitated in
the accomplishment of assigned tasks by ensuring that all required information is
available only through appropriately controlled means.  Specifically, individual
employees and other parties are restricted from access to information assets and
 23
supporting Information Technology resources that do not directly relate to their work
requirements, assigned objectives, or legitimate, authorized need. By enforcing such a
standard, the owner or custodian limits the exposure of potentially sensitive
information assets and supporting Information Technology resources and enables
management to assert appropriate control over the access to, modification of, or the
dissemination of sensitive information assets in terms of content and recipient.
Therefore, potentially adverse consequences resulting from uncontrolled access or
distribution are minimized.
• Operational Continuity and Contingency Planning (BFP-10) - The GASSP
statement for this principle is stated as, “Management shall plan for and operate
Information Technology in such a way as to preserve the continuity of organizational
operations.” [5] In order to protect information assets and supporting Information
Technology resources from disruptive events, or to be able to rapidly restore their
proper functioning in the case that such a disruptive event is unavoidable, it is
essential that organizations establish a cohesive set of preventive, mitigative, and
restorative measures, as determined to be appropriate and cost-effective by risk
assessment. Organizational entities depend on their Information Technology resource
infrastructure now more than at any previous time in history to deliver mission-critical
information in a timely fashion.  The operational importance of information assets,
whether based on cost or time factors, is such that organizations can ill afford to
endure the consequences of significantly disruptive events impacting supporting
Information Technology resources or the information assets directly.
• Information Risk Management (BFP-11) - The GASSP statement for this principle
is stated as, “Management shall ensure that information security measures are
appropriate to the value of the assets and the threats to which they are vulnerable.” [5]
In order to choose effective and efficient information security measures, management
must identify the assets to be protected, the threats to the assets, and the vulnerability
of the assets or their environment to the threats. Well-informed owners, managers,
custodians, or other responsible parties must assure the security of information assets,
with regard to the value of their confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and the
security of the supporting Information Technology resources.  Such an approach
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(performed strategically, on an on-going basis, or as changes dictate) must enable
well-informed decisions regarding whether to accept, mitigate, or transfer the risks
associated with the information assets and supporting Information Technology
resources.  These decisions should be based on the monetary value of the assets,
probability and consequences of direct or indirect harm or loss, related threats,
effectiveness of existing safeguards and controls, and whether additional safeguards or
controls could be expected to provide cost-effective incremental risk mitigation.
• Network and Infrastructure Security (BFP-12) - The GASSP statement for this
principle is stated as, “Management shall consider the potential impact on the shared
global infrastructure, e.g., the Internet, public switched networks, and other connected
systems when establishing network security measures.” [5] In order to compensate for
the increased vulnerability from and to things outside of the organization, as created
by connection to systems beyond the organization, the threat and risk model must be
changed to reflect the threat from and to things outside the organization.  For example,
connecting a UNIX system to the public switched network puts the UNIX system at
risk, and connecting the UNIX system to the Internet puts other systems at risk. All
methods for accessing Information Technology resource connectivity must contain
controls and counter-measures that implement the established security policy of the
organization appropriate to the sensitivity or criticality level of the Information
Technology resources and supported information assets.  Such controls must, at a
minimum, reflect the same security level as the information itself to ensure
consistency and cohesiveness of overall policy implementation.  This consideration
must extend to the physical as well as the logical aspect of the connectivity. The
potential to subvert access to the Information Technology resources and supported
information assets is greatest in terms of connectivity through persistent connections,
but increases with temporary connections.  This same potential exists, however,
through in-house networks, though these are inherently less flexible in their
vulnerability to exploitation.  Therefore, the security implementation must first
identify the specific weaknesses in each access method and the potential consequences
of their exploitation.  Then each weakness can be addressed through the application of
measures intended to achieve a level of protection commensurate with the
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sensitivity/criticality of the Information Technology resource and the supported
information assets.
• Legal, Regulatory, and Contractual Requirements of Information Security
(BFP-13) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as, “Management shall
take steps to be aware of and address all legal, regulatory, and contractual
requirements pertaining to information assets.” [5] In order for an organization to
diligently comply with all legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements associated
with its operations, it is necessary to ensure that no requirement exists for which
compliance measures have not been put in place.  As part of this effort, plans should
also be in place to address potential actions against the organization should their
policy, processes, or actions be called into question.
• Ethical Practices (BFP-14) - The GASSP statement for this principle is stated as,
“Management shall respect the rights and dignity of individuals when setting policy
and when selecting, implementing, and enforcing security measures.” [5] In order to
preserve employee morale and the perception of the organization and its management
as fair and ethical, and recognizing that security measures may be or become unduly
intrusive, management must be candid, fair, and conservative in developing and
enforcing security policy. Management must carefully consider employee privacy.
The key to successful policy is strict observance of fairness and respect for the
individual.  No policy is complete proof against culpability, but careful construction
and consistently unbiased execution contribute positively to the organization’s overall
risk management program. Policy provisions, including consequences for non-
compliance, must be understandable and enforceable, and enforcement must be fairly
applied.  Candor helps ensure fairness.  Security measures that cannot be disclosed
should not be applied.
The following matrix in Figure 2.1 presents the relationship of Broad Functional
Principles (BFP) to Pervasive Principles (PP). It shows that which pervasive principle is
used in developing broad functional principles. For example, while developing
Information Management Broad Functional Principle (BFP-4) the pervasive principles;
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accountability principle (PP-1), awareness principle (PP-2), multidisciplinary principle
(PP-4) and assessment principle (PP-8) are used.
PP-1 PP-2 PP-3 PP-4 PP-5 PP-6 PP-7 PP-8 PP-9
BFP-1 X X X X X X X X  X
BFP-2 X X X X  X
BFP-3 X X X X  X
BFP-4 X X X X
BFP-5 X X X X X X
BFP-6 X X X  X
BFP-7 X X X X X X
BFP-8 X X X X X X
BFP-9 X X X X X X
BFP-10 X X X X X
BFP-11 X X X X X X X
BFP-12 X X X X X
BFP-13 X X X X  X
BFP-14 X X X  X
Figure 2.1: Cross-Impact Matrix Relating BFP’s to PP’s. [5]
2.2.3.3 Detailed Security Principles
Detailed Security Principles (DSP) are subordinate to one or more of the Broad
Functional Principles, are numerous, specific, emergent and change frequently as
technology and other affecting issues evolve.
The Detailed Security Principles specifically address methods of achieving compliance
with the Broad Functional Principles with respect to existing environments and
available technology. There will be many detailed information security principles
supporting one or more Broad Functional Principles.  The Detailed Principles will
address differing technologies, environments, standards, practices, and concepts that are
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relevant to the Broad Functional Principles.  The Detailed Principles are expected to
continuously evolve to meet the challenges of emerging technology and new threats.
Following is an example of a Detailed Principle (and its underlying rationale)
supporting a Broad Functional Principle (Access Control), which supports the Pervasive
Principle (Proportionality) [5]:
• Principle
“Use one-time passwords to control logical access to all information assets deemed
critical to an organization.”
• Rationale
“Multiple-use passwords were originally the only technique available to control access
to a system.  Changes in technology made the multiple-use password obsolete in many
environments.  Therefore, the one-time password evolved.  Future technological
advances will probably result in the use of smart card technology, replacing current
password technology.  (There will be separate Detailed Principles that expand upon
and guide the application security mechanisms in the users’ environment.)”
Also the detailed principles that are developed in this Thesis work about firewalls,
vulnerability scanners, intrusion detection systems and integrity checkers can be found
on chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPED GASSP PRINCIPLES IN IMPLEMENTING A
SECURITY REVIEW PROGRAM FOR INTRUSION
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
In this chapter, the usage of GASSP principles for a security review for intrusion
management systems with different tools, which take place in different layers; will be
explained. These tools are firewalls for avoidance, vulnerability scanners for assurance,
intrusion detection systems for detection and integrity checkers for recovery layer.
3.1 Firewalls
Firewalls can be used in avoidance layer of intrusion management systems, and while
using and developing such firewalls GASSP principles can be used and GASSP detailed
security principle about firewalls can be developed.
A firewall is a protection device used as a filter between a local network and another
insecure one. The goals of the firewall are [6]:
• “To check and protect local network hosts from unauthorized disclosing of sensitive
information, virus and Trojan Horse attacks,”
• “To protect Internet servers against dangerous commands associated to services
(“telnet” or “sendmail”) and modifying or deleting files that are vital to the system.”
Techniques used for secure Internet gateways are packet filtering, and application-layer
proxy. A Packet is used to transfer information across a network and to allow many
systems to share it. The information has to be broken into pieces, which are called
packets. A packet is a block of data that carries with it the information necessary to
deliver it. Packet filtering is a mechanism that control, what data can flow to and from a
network. There are no content-based decisions. It is based on source address, destination
address, and session and application protocols used. It allows for example; not letting
anybody use Telnet to log in from outside or letting everybody send email via SMTP. It
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won’t allow for example, a user can use Telnet in from outside and no other can do so
or a user can transfer this file but not those files.
The most common forms of packet filtering are filtering by address, which is to restrict
the flow of packets on source/destination addresses, and filtering by services, which is
the flow of packets based on what protocols are involved.
Filtering by address is to allow certain external hosts to talk to certain internal hosts and
to prevent an attacker from injecting forged packets into the local network. Its risks are;
source address forgery attack, an external host claiming to be a different (trusted)
external host, and man in the “middle” forgery attack, to carry out a complete
conversation while claiming to be the trusted host.
Filtering by services is looking to the destination port and control which daemons can
be accessed. “Each of the tcp services, smtp,  nntp, ftp, finger, telnet, login, shell begins
by connecting to a socket. The same holds for udp destined for sun rpc, rip and domains
daemons. Restricting the destination ports is used. Examples are to deny external udp
access to sun rpc (e.g., nfs) and routed but allow domain name service by limiting udp
access to port 53 and to allow external access for mail and netnews by limiting tcp
access to ports 25 and 119.” [6] Risk of the filtering by services is that we can trust the
source port only as much as we trust the source machine.
Advantages of packet filtering are [6]:
• One screening router is enough to protect an entire network
• It’s doesn’t need a user knowledge or cooperation (transparency)
• Widely available in many routers
Disadvantages of packet filtering are [6]:
• Filtering tools are not perfect. They are:
♦ Hard to configure
♦ Hard to test
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♦ Incomplete
• Some protocols are not well suited to packet filtering
• Some security policies can not be enforced by normal packet filtering
Proxying is providing Internet access to a single host while appearing to provide access
to all of the internal network’s hosts. On the server side for most services, proxying
requires appropriate proxy server software. On the client side, it needs custom client
software (How to contact the proxy server and how to tell him what real server to
connect) or custom user procedures (standard client server to talk to the proxy server).
Advantages of proxying are [6]:
• Users think they’re interacting directly with internet services
• Proxy services allow logging to be performed in an effective way.
Disadvantages of proxying are [6]:
• There is a distinct lag between the introduction of a service and the availability of
proxying server for it
• Different servers for each service
• It usually requires modifications to clients and/or procedures
• It doesn’t work for some services
• It doesn’t give a protection from all protocol weaknesses
A firewall is not a complete security solution. It can perform various functions for
computer systems’ security: focusing, logging, and limiting exposure. But it cannot
protect the internal network against malicious insiders, connections that circumvent it
(modems), new threats and data-driven attacks (malicious executable code, viruses).
Also there are some techniques to improve the security of the firewalls. These are
Tunneling and Virtual Private Network (VPN). Tunneling means to encapsulate
network packets (private ones) in another network packets (Internet ones). Software
using the same protocol at the two extremities of the tunnel is used in tunneling. Packets
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are forwarded through Internet. They are compressed and encrypted. VPN technology
creates an encrypted communication channel between properly configured machines by
using, for example, SSH and PPP. SSH to create a tunnel connection, and then use PPP
to run TCP/IP traffic through it. Tunneling can be used between two firewalls or
between a firewall and stand-alone remote computer.
A VPN isn't the answer to all security. There are still risks that the computer or network
at either end of a VPN could be compromised. A single VPN may not solve all of the
problems. If everyone shared the same VPN then the benefits of the Private part would
be lost.
Firewalls are not sufficient to ensure security but they are necessary blocks to build a
reasonable security wall. Choosing the most appropriate block is also very important.
There are two kinds of firewalls [6]: Packet filters or Stateful Multi-Layer Inspection
(SMLI) and Application Level Gateways (ALG). The security policy to be implemented
determines which type of firewall is the best for a particular Local Area network. Some
SMLI firewall examples are Checkpoint system’s Firewall-1, Guardian for NT, Cisco
system’s PIX, Elron firewall. Some ALG firewall examples are TIS’s Gauntlet, T-Rex,
Altavista firewall, Cisco’s Centri firewall, EagleNT and IBM for NT.
But there is no answer to the question, which type of firewall is better. It depends upon
the Security Policy specified. Controlling which machines can reach the internal
network from outside (SMLI firewalls) and more control over outgoing connections
(ALG firewalls). But a tradeoff in choosing ALG firewalls is that they are slower, less
flexible but they have greater control.
Firewall can protect against unauthenticated interactive logins from external
environment. They block traffic from the outside to the inside and they can protect
against any type of network-borne attack. But firewalls can’t protect against attacks that
don’t go through the firewall, and traitors or idiots inside the network it protects.
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3.1.1 Firewall Examples
Some examples of firewalls and their qualifications will be explained next. These
firewalls are Checkpoint Firewall-1, Gauntlet, T-Rex.
3.1.1.1 Checkpoint Firewall -1
To fully leverage the power and reach of the Internet, organizations must guarantee the
protection of all network resources and data. This requires a complete enterprise
security solution that protects all elements of an organization—networks, systems,
applications and users. Check Point’s Secure Virtual Network (SVN) architecture
uniquely delivers end-to-end network security enabling organizations to protect
business-critical Internet, intranet and extranet traffic.
FireWall-1 is a key component of the SVN architecture and enables network security to
be managed with a single enterprise-wide policy. As the industry’s most proven security
solution, FireWall-1 delivers more than simple access control rules managing traffic
into a protected network. Check Point FireWall-1 is a comprehensive security platform
that integrates and manages all elements of enterprise security, including [7]:
• Access Control
• User Authentication
• Network Address Translation (NAT)
• Virtual Private Networking (VPN)
• High Availability
• Content Security (anti-virus, URL and Java/ActiveX screening)
• Auditing and Reporting
• LDAP-based User Management
• Intrusion Detection
• Malicious Activity Detection
• Third-party Device Management
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Enterprise security can be extended with Check Point’s Open Platform for Security
(OPSEC), providing central integration and management of complementary third-party
security applications, services and platforms.
Broad Application Support with Built-in Extensibility Check Point FireWall-1 supports
more than 150 pre-defined applications, services and protocols out of the box. Support
is provided for all popular Internet services, including the most commonly used
applications (HTTP, SMTP, Telnet, FTP, etc.), the entire TCP family of applications
and connectionless protocols, such as UDP. In addition, FireWall-1 supports important
business applications such as Oracle SQL, multimedia applications such as RealAudio
and H.323-based services, like Voice over IP (VoIP).
With its open architecture and powerful INSPECT scripting language, FireWall-1 is
extensible to new and custom applications as well. This makes FireWall-1 readily
adaptable to special customer needs and evolving security requirements to meet the
most rigorous enterprise security demands.
Check Point FireWall-1 is based upon “Stateful Inspection”, the de facto standard for
Internet firewalls invented by Check Point Software Technologies (U.S. Patent No.
5,606,668 and 5,835,716). “Stateful Inspection” provides the highest level of security
possible by incorporating communication- and application-derived state and context
information, which is stored and updated dynamically. This provides cumulative data
against which subsequent communication attempts can be evaluated. “Stateful
Inspection” provides full application-layer awareness without requiring a separate proxy
for every service. This results in improved performance, scalability and the ability to
support new and custom applications quickly. These are just some of the reasons why
customers have adopted “Stateful Inspection” as the firewall technology of choice [7].
“FireWall-1’s Network Address Translation feature conceals internal network addresses
from the Internet, avoiding their disclosure as public information. In addition to
enhancing enterprise security, Network Address Translation enables organizations to
maintain unregistered IP addressing schemes and provide Internet access to all users
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utilizing a single corporate IP address. FireWall-1’s advanced address translation
capability supports all Internet services.” [7]
Today’s enterprise networks include not only local corporate users, but also remote
locations, mobile workers and telecommuters. Before granting access to sensitive
network resources, organizations need a way of validating user authenticity.
“Check Point FireWall-1 meets this requirement with integrated support for three
powerful authentication methods and multiple authentication schemes, more than any
other security vendor. Users can be authenticated without any modification to server or
client applications. And unlike many network security products, FireWall-1 can
authenticate users of any IP-based application. FireWall-1’s open architecture allows
numerous authentication solutions to be integrated into an enterprise-wide security
policy, including FireWall-1 passwords, smart cards, token-based products like
SecurID, LDAP-stored passwords, RADIUS or TACACS+ authentication servers,
X.509 digital certificates and even biometric techniques. In addition, Check Point
provides an open application programming interface (API) as part of OPSEC that
enables third-party security vendors to develop compatible authentication products.” [7]
Check Point FireWall-1 protects users from virus attacks, malicious Java and ActiveX
applets and undesirable Web content through its integrated content security capabilities
[7]:
• Integrated Security Servers – For each connection established through a FireWall-
1 HTTP, SMTP or FTP security server, the network manager controls access to
specific resources with a high degree of granularity. For example, access can be
controlled to specific Web pages and actions, FTP files and operations (e.g., PUT/GET
commands), SMTP-specific header fields and more.
• Third Party Application Support - Through its support for the OPSEC framework,
Check Point FireWall-1 can leverage several open APIs to interface with third-party
content security applications. This enables security managers to extend the security of
their FireWall-1 installation to provide advanced functionality, such as [7]: “Anti-virus
screening to protect internal network resources from viruses that may be contained
within incoming traffic. Virus scanning is enabled using the Content Vectoring
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Protocol (CVP). URL filtering to block outbound Web requests for inappropriate or
unproductive Web content using the URL Filtering Protocol (UFP). Java Security to
intelligently screen for malicious executable content leveraging CVP.”
• Malicious Activity Detection - FireWall-1 can detect malicious activity at the
Internet gateway and alert the security manager of attempted violations of the network
security policy. FireWall-1’s Malicious Activity Detection functionality analyzes
FireWall-1 log records to detect a handful of well-known network attacks and
indications of suspicious activity.
FireWall-1 provides the underlying platform for Check Point’s industry-leading Virtual
Private Networking solution—VPN-1 Gateway. Any FireWall-1 installation can be
easily upgraded to VPN-1. VPN-1 Gateway can also be purchased as a fully integrated
solution incorporating FireWall-1.
Providing full integration of VPN and firewall security, Check Point’s VPN-1 delivers a
secure and flexible architecture for a complete enterprise-wide VPN deployment [7]:
• Remote Access VPN – Mobile and remote users can access corporate network
resources via the Internet using VPN-1 SecureClient and VPN-1 SecuRemote client
software.
• Site-to-Site VPN – VPN-1 Gateway can protect business communications traveling
between corporate locations over the Internet or any untrusted IP network.
• Extranet VPN – Business partners can safely connect to the company network to
run e-Business applications.
• Client/Server VPN – Local desktops can establish VPN tunnels with any application
server to protect against internal network threats.
Integration of network security and VPN capability eliminates the need to open multiple
ports, or “holes,” in the firewall to blindly pass VPN traffic as is necessary with many
standalone VPN devices. Instead, all controls defined in the FireWall-1 security policy
are applied to VPN traffic—guaranteeing complete integrity of network security.
VPN capability is defined as an integral component of an overall enterprise security
policy for efficient management and easy deployment.
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Check Point’s graphical user interface provides a single management console for
defining and managing multiple elements of a Secure Virtual Network: firewall
security, VPNs, network address translation, bandwidth management and data
compression. All object definitions (users, hosts, networks, services, etc.) are shared
among all applications for efficient policy creation and security management.
FireWall-1 is designed to deliver scalable security management for all size
organizations, from small offices to globally dispersed enterprise networks [7]. With a
unique three-tier architecture, a single enterprise-wide security policy can be managed
centrally and automatically deployed to an unlimited number of FireWall-1 enforcement
points. Automatic policy distribution eliminates the possibility of misconfiguration
when managing multiple firewalls.
 “Check Point FireWall-1 can be easily deployed throughout an organization for true
enterprise security. For organizations (enterprise networks or managed service
providers) requiring separate security policies for independent business units or
customers, Check Point offers Provider-1. With Provider-1, multiple FireWall-1
security policies can be managed from a single console, while maintaining complete
isolation of security and user databases.” [7]
• Unparalleled Platform Support - Check Point’s patented Stateful Inspection
technology enables FireWall-1 to be deployed on a variety of operating systems and
platforms for maximum flexibility and security [7]:
♦ Server Operating Systems
- Hewlett-Packard HP-UX
- IBM AIX
- Linux
- Microsoft Windows NT
- Microsoft Windows 2000
- Sun Microsystems Solaris
♦ Check Point VPN-1 Appliances
♦ Third-party security appliances, routers and switches
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The Open Platform for Security (OPSEC) extends Check Point’s Secure Virtual
Network architecture by providing a unique, open platform for integration and
interoperability. Over 200 companies have adopted its enterprise integration interfaces
to develop complete integrated Internet security solutions. The choice of best-of-breed
products and services offers customers the flexibility to design an e-Business security
architecture that matches the challenges unique to the company’s own network and
business needs. [7]
• Integrated Internet Security – “Check Point protects the customer investment in
VPN-1/FireWall-1 by continually updating and defining new integration interfaces for
key technologies including PKI, directories, authentication, content security, intrusion
detection and others. Using the OPSEC Software Development Kit (SDK) and
industry protocols, vendors and customers connect easily to the SVN architecture.
Rigorous testing for OPSEC certification guarantees seamless integration with VPN-
1/FireWall-1, eliminating the questionable interoperability of single suite products.
OPSEC also delivers the value of plug-and-play security technology to enable a true
multi-layered enforcement structure, incorporating a wide range of technologies to
protect data, applications and users. OPSEC is leading the industry to provide the
integrated Internet security needed to take full advantage of the promise of e-
Business.” [7]
• Broad Choice of Network Configurations – “A growing number of Internet
Service Providers have implemented OPSEC-compliant products with VPN-
1/FireWall-1 to deliver a wide range of managed security services to customers
seeking to outsource their security and VPN services. For the corporate network,
Check Point offers the most versatile choices for best-of-breed infrastructure
deployment platforms in the security industry. Organizations can deploy Check
Point’s security solutions on routers, appliances, systems, switches and other
internetworking devices. This flexibility allows customers to leverage their existing
hardware investment, enabling secure e-Business.” [7]
Check Point FireWall-1 is much more than just a firewall. It is a complete platform for
integrating all aspects of enterprise security. FireWall-1 interoperates with multiple
applications and supports a variety of functional modules to provide the industry’s only
solution for Secure Virtual Networking.
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The management features of Checkpoint Firewall-1 are [7]:
• Reporting: The Check Point Reporting Module generates custom and pre-defined
reports from FireWall-1 log data for comprehensive security auditing, activity trending
and accounting.
• LDAP: The Account Management Module enables FireWall-1 to query LDAP-
compliant directory servers for user-level security information that is used to enforce
elements of the enterprise security policy, such as user authentication, data encryption
and access control privileges.
• Router Security Management: The Open Security Extension™ enables security
policies for routers and other third-party security devices to be defined, deployed and
managed centrally eliminating point-to-point configuration and manual definition of
access control lists (ACLs).
The VPN and security modules of Firewall-1 are [7]:
• VPN: Check Point’s VPN-1 product family is based on FireWall-1 and provides a
complete solution set for enterprise VPN deployments. Solutions include software-
based VPN gateway products, VPN appliances, client-based VPN software, VPN
acceleration cards and turnkey Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) products.
• Intrusion Detection: Check Point RealSecure is a real-time attack recognition and
response system, providing proactive network protection from attacks or misuse. It
recognizes more than 300 types of attacks and responds by automatically
reconfiguring FireWall-1 to terminate connections and protect against future attacks.
The performance and reliability of Firewall-1 can be described as [7]:
• Quality of Service: FloodGate-1 is a policy-based bandwidth management solution
that can integrate with FireWall-1 to ensure reliable performance for business-critical
traffic on VPN, private WAN and Internet links.
• High Availability: Check Point’s High Availability Module delivers seamless
connectivity in the event of a gateway failure. Advanced firewall synchronization is
leveraged to maintain connections during FireWall-1 gateway fail-over.
• Server Load Balancing: Connect Control enables FireWall-1 to deliver application
server load balancing by distributing incoming connections across a pool of
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application servers for improved user response times and enhanced network
connectivity.
• Compression: The Check Point Compression Module significantly increases the
performance and capacity of network infrastructures by compressing data at policy
enforcement points
“Firewall-1 can operate on operating systems; Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 (SP4, SP5
and SP6), Sun Solaris 2.6, Solaris 7 (32 bit only), Red Hat Linux 6.0, 6.1,HP-UX 10.20,
11.0 (32 bit only),and IBM AIX 4.2.1, 4.3.2. Firewall-1 also supports the hardware
platforms of Check Point VPN-1 Appliances, ODS SecurCom 8000 family, Alcatel
(Xylan) switches, Nortel ARN, ASN, BN and System 5000 routers, and Nortel
Contivity switches. Firewall-1 requires 40 MegaBytes of disk space and a memory of
64 MB min.for Management Server and 128 MBs for Enforcement Module 128 MB.
Also 32 MBs is needed for GUI Client. Firewall-1 requires a network interface of type
ATM, Ethernet, Fast Ethernet, FDDI or Token Ring.” [7]
3.1.1.2 Gauntlet Firewall 6.0
“Gauntlet Firewall carefully watches everything that attempts to pass by and letting you
selectively decide what gets in and what gets out. Gauntlet Firewall can guard one door
or many doors, making it ideal for protecting small, medium, or large size networks
with one site or multiple sites around the world. “ [8]
For securely transferring data between multiple sites and remote users the included
Gauntlet VPN can be used to ensure privacy of communications. VPN is not an add-on
in Gauntlet Firewall, it is included at no additional cost. Gauntlet VPN uses the Internet
to send encrypted data from the gatekeeper at the main door to traveling employees, off-
site engineers, and other corporate sites with no compromise in security and immediate
return of investment.
The Single rule view feature uses “one screen to review, add and edit security rules for
groups and objects - eliminating the need to search multiple screens for firewall and
policy information.” [8] This eliminates the need to edit firewall rules individually and
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enables to add and edit rules on multiple firewalls easily. Variable administration
privilege provides multiple levels of administrative control from multiple locations,
allowing local offices to edit rules based on permissions set.
The New Global Enterprise Management System (GEMS) add-on complements
Gauntlet v6.0 by enabling worldwide deployment, administration, and management of
as many as 500 Gauntlet firewalls and VPN devices.
With the inclusion of Crystal Reports and the new logging daemon, Gauntlet reporting
has greatly improved and now utilizes four different log files, Applications, VPN,
Kernel and Statistics. The Rule View allows to control the logging level for each rule,
enabling to decide what to log. With the GEMS add-on, the ability to see a consolidated
view of all firewall logs is added..
In Gauntlet 6.0, “Gauntlet Virtual Private Networking (VPN) integrated with Gauntlet
firewall. Single rule view allows reviewing firewall and policy rules from a single
screen. The Graphical User Interface (GUI) is enhanced. Variable administration
privilege with multiple levels of administrative control from multiple locations is added.
UDP Proxy support is included and also RTSP-PDK Proxy support is added. Logging
and reporting systems are enhanced and Multi Bind Address and port pairs are used.
There is a new authentication mechanism. And Single Sign On Global Enterprise
Management System(GEMS) is now an add-on.” [8]
The Gauntlet v6.0 Features & Benefits are [8]:
• Gauntlet Firewall offers flexible protection - Gauntlets' unique architecture allows
the administrator to flexibly mix and match packet filtering, application proxy, or
adaptive proxy technology within a single application.
• New Single Rule View eases administration - Single rule view uses one screen to
review security rules - eliminating the need to search multiple screens for firewall and
policy information. The Graphical User Interface (GUI) provides a quick, effective
method of adding, deleting, or modifying firewall rules for a user or group.
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• Variable Administration provides distributed firewall control - Managing
hundreds of firewall and Virtual Private Networking (VPN) devices is a difficult task.
The new Variable administration feature provides permission based firewall control
for easier and more consistent distributed policy management.
• UDP Proxy adds connectionless protocol support - This new proxy handles most
UDP-based protocols. Pre-defined configurations for DNS, NTP, NetBIOS, Syslog,
TFPT, and WINS are supplied. The proxy creates its own concept of a UDP
connection, which supplies better security and enables logging of traffic that was
previously unloggable.
• RTSP-PDK Proxy support - This new proxy handles traffic that uses the RTSP
protocol such as Real Audio's G2 and Apple's Quicktime. The proxy includes both
TCP and UDP support and supports the Adaptive Proxy functionality for improved
performance. It is also possible to enable bandwidth throttling for individual
configuration sets to limit connection usage from specific sources.
• Global Enterprise Management System (GEMS) add-on reduces network
complexity - The Global Enterprise Management System (GEMS) is an affordable,
scalable management tool that seamlessly integrates with Gauntlet v6.0. GEMS can be
installed on Windows 98, Windows NT, and Windows 2000 machines and enables
worldwide deployment, administration, and management of up to 500 firewalls and/or
Virtual Private Networking devices.
• Re-designed logging feature enhances reporting - Enhanced logging feature
enables granular control over firewall reporting. Gauntlet v6.0 adds distinctive packet
filter logging and bundling of Crystal Reports for more extensive reporting. Also, the
addition of the new logging daemon provides more functionality than the traditional
syslog daemon. The new daemon utilities four different log files - one each for
Applications, VPN, Kernel, and Statistics. The Rule View in the GUI allows you to
control the logging level for each rule.
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• Gauntlet Virtual Private Networking (VPN) is now tightly integrated - Gauntlet
Virtual Private Networking (VPN) is no longer installed as an add-on module -
simplifying VPN administration.
• IPSec VPN compliance ensures compatibility with other popular IPSec VPN's -
Gauntlet is ICSA IPSec compliant, assuring successful VPN deployments with other
popular IPSec VPN manufacturers. Gauntlet's VPN technology provides an easy,
affordable, and secure means for businesses to securely communicate with each other.
• Mode-config/Virtual Identity facilitates remote end-user access - Mode-config
gives remote VPN users transparent access to their local networking resources.
Gauntlet's virtual identity allows remote VPN clients to authenticate once, which
decreases your wait time and saves valuable bandwidth.
• Single Sign-On simplifies authentication - Single Sign-On allows a user to
authenticate only once through the firewall for access to other services on the network.
Single Sign-On reduces the number of times a user would have to authenticate to other
corporate applications within the network. This streamlines the authentication process
for internal users. With Single Sign-On, internal users will no longer have to
authenticate separately for each proxy.
• McAfee guards your network from virus mutations - Gauntlet integrates the
McAfee Anti-Virus software for protection against viruses. Corporations will receive
automatic updates as new cures are released to protect against the latest virus
outbreaks.
• McAfee scanning improvements increase Anti-Virus/SMTP performance -
Gauntlet was tuned to enhance the SMTP performance. As a result of these and other
improvements, Gauntlet improves Anti-Virus scanning performance by 40%.
• Gauntlet internal re-design improves Web/HTTP performance - Adjusting the
Firewall gateway process of the Gauntlet v6.0 has lead to an HTTP performance
increase of 10%.
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• Professional service provides additional security expertise - PGP Security's
experienced staff of security experts can help organization of any size with their
security needs. Talking directly to our support engineer shortens response time and
reduces the complexity of supporting multiple products from different manufacturers.
Small, medium, or large corporations can call one number for all their support issues.
The system requirements of Gauntlet firewall are [8]:
• For Sun: Solaris 8 operating system UltraSPARC or Enteprise Class system - 128
MB of RAM (more is strongly recommended), 4GB of free disk space
• For Hewlett Packard: HP-UX 11 operating system 64-bit HP PA-RISC system -
128 MB of RAM (more is strongly recommended), 4GB of free disk space
3.1.1.3 T-Rex Security Suit
The T-Rex Firewall is a highly integrated enterprise security suite that combines
functions that normally require the installation of multiple products. Its functions are
[9]:
• Access control
• Authentication
• Extensible Application controls via application specific APIs.
• Hardware assisted Virtual Private Network (VPN)
• Network Address Translation (NAT)
• Content Filtering (URL, Java, ActiveX, JavaScripts, SPAM)
• Fault tolerant High Availability Option (99.999% availability)
• Workload Balancing
• Non-disruptive hardware and software modifications
• Extensive auditing and reporting tools that can produce more than 52 unique reports
• Real-time performance monitor
• Network scanning and intrusion detection tools
• Totally automated operations to minimize administration overhead.
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The T-Rex functions can be described as [9]: “T-Rex provides unequaled scalability to
meet the requirements of small, large and ultra-large organizations. Its performance
supports more than a gigabit/second throughput. Hardware assisted IPSec VPN provides
encrypted communications without sacrificing system throughput. It provides support
for hundreds of services and applications. T-Rex provides organizations with the ability
to define a single security policy that can be distributed across multiple firewalls from a
single administration workstation. T-Rex is an advanced hybrid firewall designed to
repel the most sophisticated attacks from skilled and determined crackers. Application
specific proxies block application based attacks that pass unnoticed through the best of
the stateful packet filters. The proxy API’s also allow local customization to fine tune
security controls for third party applications.
The T-Rex fault-tolerant architecture provides multiple levels of error detection,
reporting and recovery. The “fail-safe” architecture blocks the flow of traffic when an
error occurs thus preventing accidental violations of the security policy. Unlike packet
filter firewalls that can fail-open in the event of a hardware or software error  T-Rex
will fail shut blocking unauthorized traffic. T-Rex logs and controls all traffic between
secured and unsecured networks. T-Rex can be configured to match the security policies
of an organization instead of imposing its own policy upon an organization. T-Rex is
easy to install, configure, maintain and use. T-Rex works with shrink wrapped
applications to provide easy and transparent access from secured to unsecured (Internet)
networks.”
“T-Rex is available on AIX, HP-UX, Linux, and Solaris (SPARC and Intel) systems. In
addition it is available on a variety of embedded systems using PowerPC, UltraSPARC
and Intel architectures.” [9] T-Rex runs on single and multi-processor systems as well
as clusters of SMP systems. T-Rex’s key benefits are [9]:
• Prevent unauthorized access to protected networks
• Prevent unauthorized modification or destruction of secured data
• Defend against Denial of Service Attacks
• Log and report network usage including break-in attempts
• Prevent unscheduled outages that deny access to servers
• Balance workloads across multiple servers improving performance
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• Improve service availability with dynamic traffic re-direct.
• Mach 3 Performance
The T-Rex firewall is a highly integrated enterprise security suite that combines
functions that normally require the installation of multiple products. Its hybrid
architecture provides maximum security and performance. Application specific proxies
provide high levels of security and access control tailored for the application. The
Application Program Interface (API) allows site specific extensions to the application
proxy. This provides fine grain application control beyond the standard product. Stateful
Packet Filters can also be employed for applications that do not require the same level
of security. A circuit level proxy is also provided for additional flexibility. This
unprecedented flexibility allows the security administrator to configure the firewall to
meet their unique site requirements.
The T-Rex network security suite derived from technology that has been securing large
organizations for more than five years. It uses technology developed by dozens of
experts from around the world. Making T-Rex an open source project ensures that it
will continue to remain state-of-the-art. Use of open source means it will be subjected to
wide scale peer review by leading experts. This process will provide users with greater
reliability, more security features and faster response to new security threats. It also
makes the firewall more affordable.
Install scripts on the CD-ROMs automatically harden the operating system while
installing the T.Rex software. This allows installations in less than 10 minutes. The
multi-tiered support structure offered by FAS allows customers to choose the level of
support they require. This makes the product very affordable.
The main technologies found in T-Rex include [9]:
• Application specific proxies for E-mail (SMTP, POP3), File Transfer (FTP), World
Wide Web (HHTP, SHHTP, SSL), Terminal Services (Telent, TN3270), X Window
System (X11), and Real Audio & Real Video
• Advanced Application proxy with extensible application controls via an API.
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• A generalized RPC and UDP proxy
• Hardware assisted Virtual Private Network (VPN)
• Network Address Translation (NAT)
• Socks V4 & V5 Circuit Gateway
• E-mail controls
• Stateful Packet Filtering
• Integrated Content Filtering (URL, Java, ActiveX, JavaScripts, SPAM)
• Integrated fault tolerant High Availability Option (99.999% availability)
• Integrated Workload Balancing
• High Speed Caching
• Split DNS
• Intrusion Monitoring and Detection
• Graphical User Interface
• Network Scanners
• Integrated Authentication Servers
• Built-in monitors for detecting attacks, checking system and network integrity and
performance and capacity,
• Automated operations including automatic log management and report generation
T-Rex provides unequaled scalability to meet the requirements of small, large and ultra-
large organizations. T-Rex supports more than a gigabit/second throughput. Hardware
assisted IPSec VPN provides encrypted communications without sacrificing systems
throughput. It provides support for hundreds of services and applications. T-Rex
provides organizations with the ability to define a single security policy that can be
distributed across multiple firewalls from a single administration workstation.
3.1.2 Firewalls and GASSP Principles
Some of the Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) can be used in
developing and using firewalls in the process of avoiding the attacks to our system.
GASSP principles are in hierarchical order, which is from pervasive to detailed. The
relevant GASSP principles are Access Control Broad Functional Principle, and Network
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and Infrastructure Security Broad Functional Principle. These principles of GASSP can
be used in implementing and configuring firewalls in order to protect the computer
system of an organization. Also a detailed security principle can be formed for
vulnerability scanners.
The access to the system from the outer world can be limited to only authorized sites or
IPs by using firewalls. By using the Access Control Broad Functional Principle the
firewall can be configured to balance the access to information assets and supporting
Information Technology resources.
Firewalls can be used to learn the impacts of the Internet to the information system and
to reveal the vulnerabilities raised because of the Internet. The attempts of attack to the
information system from internet can be prevented by using a good configured firewall.
And such a configuration can be implemented by using Network and Infrastructure
Broad Functional Principle as a guide.
3.1.2.1 Developed Detailed Security Principle About Firewalls
The principle can be stated as, “Use firewalls in the process of preventing the attacks
coming from outside to the organization’s information system.” Firewalls are able to
prevent the types of attacks, which are possible for an organization’s network by
denying the connections to the system in regard to their configurations. As seen above
firewalls are used in avoidance layer of the intrusion management systems for
preventing the system from the attacks. The GASSP principles about this process’ point
out the firewalls.
3.2 Vulnerability Scanners
Vulnerability scanners can be used in assurance layer of intrusion management systems,
and while using and developing such scanners GASSP principles can be used and
GASSP detailed security principle about vulnerability scanners can be developed.
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Many end-users, such as employees within a company, should not have access to each
other’s machines, to administrative functions, to network devices or similar rights. Of
course in practice this is usually not achieved, and a user with minimal skills will be
able to do a successful penetration and achieve remote administrative rights of your
network within a few minutes of exploration.
Because of the amount of flexibility needed for normal operation, internal networks can
not afford maximum security. However with no security at all, internal users can be a
major threat for many corporate internal networks. A user within the company already
has access to many resources and does not need to bypass firewalls or other security
mechanisms which prevent non-trusted sources, such as Internet users, to access the
internal network. Such internal users can also make sure that it is hard enough to
identify or even detect.
Other than internal users, poor network security will mean that once a hacker gets hold
of a computer which is within your network, he or she also has access to the rest of the
Internal Network. Many holes exist which allow hackers to tunnel through different
protocols, such as SMTP (e-mail) and HTTP, to bypass security mechanisms such as
firewalls and bastion hosts. Such attacks will allow a more sophisticated attacker to
easily penetrate and get administrative rights over an internal network, meaning
confidential e-mails and documents can be read, computers can be trashed leading to
loss of information, possible business information leakage and other problems. All these
vulnerable points require a vulnerability check for the whole system. This check can be
done via Vulnerability Scanner tools.
Vulnerability scanning is the process of checking for all the potential methods that an
attacker might use to tamper with an organization’s network. By analyzing what types
of software and software configurations are on a given network, scanners are able to
determine what types of attack are possible against a network so it can defend itself
accordingly. Vulnerability scanning has become a primary focus of network
administrators as the potential threat of a security breach has become preeminent.
Network and software vulnerabilities exist in two basic forms: known vulnerabilities
and unknown vulnerabilities. Known vulnerabilities are those that have been identified
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and isolated by a security scan. An advisory is then published to alert users of the
existing hole or flaw. Unknown vulnerabilities have not been discovered or publicly
acknowledged, making them a potential security threat. Many vulnerability scanners are
able to check both known and unknown vulnerabilities.
3.2.1 Vulnerability Scanner Examples
Some examples of vulnerability scanners and their qualifications will be explained next.
These vulnerability scanners are eEye Retina, Languard, and Nessus.
3.2.1.1 eEye Retina
Retina is a network vulnerability scanner. While most security scanners confine
themselves to searching for only known vulnerabilities, Retina shatters the mold of the
typical security scanner through its use of Artificial Intelligence(AI). The AI component
allows Retina to think like a hacker or security analyst would if they were attempting to
break into your network. Retina searches for both known and unknown vulnerabilities.
Retina discovered a hole in Microsoft Internet Information Sever. Using Retina, a hole
that affected over a million Windows NT web servers on the Internet was identified. A
serious flaw, which left unchecked, could have been devastating. Retina has been the
force behind several other high-profile vulnerability advisories including a flaw in
Ultraseek, the Infoseek search engine.
Retina has the ability to scan, monitor and fix vulnerabilities within a network’s
Internet, Intranet, and Extranet. Thus, giving the network administrator complete
control across all possible points of attack within an organization and the confidence
required in operating a network to its fullest potential. Retina includes easy-to-navigate
reporting tools to help identify and isolate high priority fixes, allowing total command
over auditing network security and open network gateways into an internal network.
Retina is designed to identify and alert security vulnerabilities, suggest fixes and report
possible security holes within a network’s Internet, Intranet and Extranet systems. Its
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scanning capabilities provide a network security analysis. Retina includes vulnerability
auditing modules for the following systems and services [10]:
• NetBIOS
• HTTP, CGI and WinCGI
• FTP
• DNS
• DoS vulnerabilities
• POP, SMTP and LDAP
• TCP/IP and UDP
• Registry
• Services
• Users and Accounts
• Password vulnerabilities
• Publishing extensions
• Database servers
• Firewalls and Routers
• Proxy Servers
 “Retina can produce fully documented network audit reports based on its security
scans. Smart reporting allows the network administrator to access, read and print these
real-time security test results with ease. The reports detail all security holes and flaws
that are detected in a scan and are ready to print. Two options are available for
reporting: the Technical Report with intricate detail to satisfy IT personnel, and the
Executive Report for high-level management summaries.” [10]
3.2.1.2 Languard
LANguard is a vulnerability scanner from GFI. Languard can enumerate possible entry
points such as , “Rogue services and open ports, SNMP holes, rogue or backdoor users,
Trojan Horses or backdoor software, open shares, weak network passwords, and
enumeration of users, services etc.” [11]
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The methods of Languard used in its operation are “Information gathering, operating
system identification, known security issues in software packages, live host detection,
any hot fixes installed, and registry entries.” [11]
In rising alerts, well known security issues are immediately recognized and also
intelligent scanning methods are used. The output can be given in the formats of HTML
and XML. Also it has the ability to compare scans, to learn about new possible entry
points.
Extra Features of Languard can be stated as, “exploitation of NETBIOS vulnerability in
Windows 95,98 and ME, SNMP auditing, trace route, DNS lookup, remote machine
shutdown and sending spoofed messages (social engineering techniques used in
hacking).” [11]
3.2.1.3 Nessus
Nessus is a vulnerability scanner from the NESSUS Corp. It can be freely downloaded.
The main features of Nessus Security Scanner are [12]:
• Plug-in architecture – “Each security test is written as an external plug-in. This
way, you can easily add your own tests without having to read the code of the nessusd
engine. The complete list of the Nessus plug-ins is online and can be found on
internet.”
• NASL – “The Nessus Security Scanner includes NASL, (Nessus Attack Scripting
Language) a language designed to write security test easily and quickly (security
checks can also be written in C).”
• Up-to-date security vulnerability database – “Nessus mostly focus on the
development of security checks for recent security holes. Security checks database is
updated on a daily basis and all the newest security checks are available on FTP
servers and mirrors.”
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• Client-server architecture – “The Nessus Security Scanner is made up of two parts:
A server, which performs the attacks, and a client which is the front-end. We can run
the server and the client on different systems. That is, auditing whole network from a
personal computer can be done, whereas the server performs its attacks from the main
frame which is upstairs. There are several clients: one for X11, one for Win32 and one
written in Java.”
• Ability to test an unlimited amount of hosts at the same time – “Depending on
the power of the station running the Nessus server, test of two, ten or forty hosts can
be done at the same time.”
• Smart service recognition – “Nessus does not believe that the target hosts will
respect the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigned port numbers. This
means that it will recognize a FTP server running on a non-standard port (for instance
31337 ), or a web server running on port 8080.”
• Multiples services – “If  two web servers (or more) is running on the same host, one
on port 80 and another on port 8080. Nessus will test both of them.”
• Coordinated tests – “The security tests performed by Nessus cooperate so that
nothing useless is made. If FTP server does not offer anonymous logins, then
anonymous-related security checks will not be performed.”
• Cracker behavior – “Nessus does not believe that version x.y.z of a given software
is immune to a specific or any security problem. 95% of the security checks will
actually perform their job - they'll try to overflow your buffers, relay some mails, and
even to crash down the computer!”
• Reports with guidance – “Nessus will not only tell you what's wrong on your
network, but will, most of the time, tell you how to prevent crackers from exploiting
the security holes found and will give you the risk level of each problem found (from
Low to Very High).”
• Exportable reports – “The Unix client can export Nessus reports as ASCII text,
LaTeX, HTML, HTML (with pies and graphs) and an easy-to-parse file format.”
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• Multilingual support – “Nessus can issue reports in English or in French. More
languages are to come.”
• Independent developers – “The Nessus developers are independent from the rest of
the world, so we will not hide a security vulnerability in the program XYZ because we
have a contract with them.”
• Easy-to-reach developers – “The contact with the developers can be implemented
easily.”
3.2.2 Vulnerability Scanners and GASSP Principles
Some of the Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) can be used in
developing and using vulnerability scanners in network security analysis, and system
security checks. Also vulnerability scanners should be used in information security
policy development. GASSP principles are in hierarchical order, which is from
pervasive to detailed. The relevant GASSP principles are Assessment Pervasive
Principle, Information Risk Management Broad Functional Principle, Network and
Infrastructure Security Broad Functional Principle, and Operational Continuity and
Contingency Planning Broad Functional Principle. These principles of GASSP can be
used in vulnerability checking processes of the information systems` of an organization.
These principles are generally about checking the vulnerabilities and risks on the
Information System. Also a detailed security principle can be formed for vulnerability
scanners.
The risks to information and information systems should be assessed periodically,
because the information and risks to the information changes everytime. So there should
be a periodic assessment of the vulnerable points in the system. Checking the vulnerable
points of the system can assess risks and vulnerability scanners can be used for this
assessment in the guidance of the Assessment Pervasive Principle.
Vulnerability scanning tools also give possible measures for the vulnerable points of the
system they checked, and they can help taking measures. To choose effective and
efficient information security measures, management must identify the assets to be
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protected, the threats to the assets, and the vulnerability of the assets or their
environment to the threats. While developing and choosing a vulnerability scanner,
Information Risk Management Broad Functional Principle should also be taken into
account.
Vulnerability scanners can be used to learn the impacts of the internet to the information
system and to reveal the vulnerabilities risen because of the internet. In this process the
guidance of Network and Infrastructure Security Broad Functional Principle plays an
important role too.
To preserve the continuity of the information system all the risks and vulnerable points
of the system should be known and necessary measures should be taken. In this process
vulnerability scanners must be used. And Operational Continuity and Contingency
Planning Broad Functional Principle takes an important role in this process too.
3.2.2.1 Developed Detailed Security Principle About Vulnerability Scanners
The principle can be stated as, “Use vulnerability scanner programs in the process of
checking all of the potential methods that an attacker might use to tamper with an
organization’s network.” Vulnerability scanners are able to determine the types of
attacks, which are possible for an organization’s network, by analyzing network’s
software types and software configurations. Both known and unknown vulnerabilities
can be checked by many of the vulnerability scanners. As seen above vulnerability
scanners are used in vulnerability assessment process of the information systems and
they play an important role in this process. The GASSP principles about this process’
point out the vulnerability scanner tools and vulnerability scanning.
3.2.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection can be describe as, “Pertaining to techniques which attempt to detect
intrusion into a computer or network by observation of actions, security logs, or audit
data. Detection of break-ins or attempts either manually or via software expert systems
that operate on logs or other information available on the network.” [1] Intrusion
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Detection Systems (IDS) resides in the detection layer of the intrusion management
systems and plays an important and key role in this layer.
Intrusion detection systems help computer systems prepare for and deal with attacks.
They accomplish this goal by collecting information from a variety of system and
network sources, then analyzing the information for symptoms of security problems. In
some cases, intrusion detection systems allow the user to specify real-time responses to
the violations. Intrusion detection systems perform a variety of functions [13]:
• Monitoring and analysis of user and system activity
• Auditing of system configurations and vulnerabilities
• Assessing the integrity of critical system and data files
• Recognition of activity patterns reflecting known attacks
• Statistical analysis for abnormal activity patterns
• Operating system audit trail management, with recognition of user activity reflecting
policy violations
Some systems provide additional features, including [13]:
• Automatic installation of vendor-provided software patches
• Installation and operation of decoy servers to record information about intruders.
The combination of these features allows system managers to more easily handle the
monitoring, audit, and assessment of their systems and networks. This ongoing
assessment and audit activity is a necessary part of sound security management practice.
Intrusion Detection Systems are security management tools that [13]:
• Collect information from a variety of system sources,
• Analyze that information for patterns reflecting misuse or unusual activity,
• In some cases, automatically respond to detected activity, and
• Report the outcome of the detection process.
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3.2.3.1 Major Types of Intrusion Detection Systems
Many IDSs can be described in terms of three fundamental functional components [14]:
• Information Collection – the different sources of event information used to
determine whether an intrusion has taken place. These sources can be drawn from
different levels of the system, with network, host, and application monitoring most
common.
• Analysis – the part of intrusion detection systems that actually organizes and makes
sense of the events derived from the information sources, deciding when those events
indicate that intrusions are occurring or have already taken place. The most common
analysis approaches are misuse detection and anomaly detection.
• Response – the set of actions that the system takes once it detects intrusions. These
are typically grouped into active and passive measures, with active measures involving
some automated intervention on the part of the system, and passive measures
involving reporting IDS findings to humans, who are then expected to take action
based on those reports.
There are several design approaches used in Intrusion Detection. These drive the
features provided by a specific IDS and determine the detection capabilities for that
system. For those who must evaluate different IDS candidates for a given system
environment, these approaches can help them determine what goals are best addressed
by each IDS [14].
3.2.3.1.1 Information Collection
The most common way to classify IDSs is to group them by information source. Some
IDSs analyze network packets, captured from network backbones or LAN segments, to
find attackers. Other IDSs analyze information sources generated by the operating
system or application software for signs of intrusion.
• Network-Based Intrusion Detection Systems - The majority of commercial
intrusion detection systems are network-based. These IDSs detect attacks by capturing
and analyzing network packets. Listening on a network segment or switch, one
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network-based IDS can monitor the network traffic affecting multiple hosts that are
connected to the network segment, thereby protecting those hosts. Network-based
IDSs often consist of a set of single-purpose sensors or hosts placed at various points
in a network. These units monitor network traffic, performing local analysis of that
traffic and reporting attacks to a central management console. As the sensors are
limited to running the IDS, they can be more easily secured against attack. Many of
these sensors are designed to run in “stealth” mode, in order to make it more difficult
for an attacker to determine their presence and location.
Advantages of Network-Based IDSs are [14]:
♦ A few well-placed network-based IDSs can monitor a large network.
♦ The deployment of network-based IDSs has little impact upon an existing
network. Network-based IDSs are usually passive devices that listen on a
network wire without interfering with the normal operation of a network. Thus,
it is usually easy to retrofit a network to include network-based IDSs with
minimal effort.
♦ Network-based IDSs can be made very secure against attack and even made
invisible to many attackers.
Disadvantages of Network-Based IDSs are [14]:
♦ Network-based IDSs may have difficulty processing all packets in a large or
busy network and, therefore, may fail to recognize an attack launched during
periods of high traffic. Some vendors are attempting to solve this problem by
implementing IDSs completely in hardware, which is much faster. The need to
analyze packets quickly also forces vendors to both detect fewer attacks and
also detect attacks with as little computing resource as possible, which can
reduce detection effectiveness.
♦ Many of the advantages of network-based IDSs don’t apply to more modern
switch-based networks. Switches subdivide networks into many small segments
(usually one fast Ethernet wire per host) and provide dedicated links between
hosts serviced by the same switch. Most switches do not provide universal
monitoring ports and this limits the monitoring range of a network-based IDS
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sensor to a single host. Even when switches provide such monitoring ports,
often the single port cannot mirror all traffic traversing the switch.
♦ Network-based IDSs cannot analyze encrypted information. This problem is
increasing as more organizations (and attackers) use virtual private networks.
♦ Most network-based IDSs cannot tell whether or not an attack was successful;
they can only discern that an attack was initiated. This means that after a
network-based IDS detects an attack, administrators must manually investigate
each attacked host to determine whether it was indeed penetrated.
♦ Some network-based IDSs have problems dealing with network-based attacks
that involve fragmenting packets. These malformed packets cause the IDSs to
become unstable and crash.
• Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems - Host-based IDSs operate on information
collected from within an individual computer system. “This vantage point allows host-
based IDSs to analyze activities with great reliability and precision, determining
exactly which processes and users are involved in a particular attack on the operating
system.” [14] Furthermore, unlike network-based IDSs, host-based IDSs can see the
outcome of an attempted attack, as they can directly access and monitor the data files
and system processes usually targeted by attacks. Host-based IDSs normally utilize
information sources of two types, operating system audit trails, and system logs.
Operating system audit trails are usually generated at the innermost (kernel) level of
the operating system, and are therefore more detailed and better protected than system
logs. However, system logs are much less obtuse and much smaller than audit trails,
and are furthermore far easier to comprehend. Some host-based IDSs are designed to
support a centralized IDS management and reporting infrastructure that can allow a
single management console to track many hosts. Others generate messages in formats
that are compatible with network management systems.
Advantages of Host-Based IDSs are [14]:
♦ Host-based IDSs, with their ability to monitor events local to a host, can detect
attacks that cannot be seen by network-based IDS.
♦ Host-based IDSs can often operate in an environment in which network traffic is
encrypted, when the host-based information sources are generated before data is
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encrypted and/or after the data is decrypted at the destination host. Host-based
IDSs are unaffected by switched networks.
♦ When Host-based IDSs operate on OS audit trails, they can help detect Trojan
Horse or other attacks that involve software integrity breaches. These appear as
inconsistencies in process execution.
Disadvantages Host-Based IDSs are [14]:
♦ Host-based IDSs are harder to manage, as information must be configured and
managed for every host monitored.
♦ Since at least the information sources (and sometimes part of the analysis
engines) for host-based IDSs reside on the host targeted by attacks, the IDS may
be attacked and disabled as part of the attack.
♦ Host-based IDSs are not well suited for detecting network scans or other such
surveillance that targets an entire network, because the IDS only sees those
network packets received by its host.
♦ Host-based IDSs can be disabled by certain denial-of-service attacks.
♦ When host-based IDSs use operating system audit trails as an information
source, the amount of information can be immense, requiring additional local
storage on the system.
♦ Host-based IDSs use the computing resources of the hosts they are monitoring,
therefore inflicting a performance cost on the monitored systems.
• Application-Based Intrusion Detection Systems - Application-based IDSs are a
special subset of host-based IDSs that analyze the events transpiring within a software
application. The most common information sources used by application-based IDSs
are the application’s transaction log files. The ability to interface with the application
directly, with significant domain or application-specific knowledge included in the
analysis engine, allows application-based IDSs to detect suspicious behavior due to
authorized users exceeding their authorization. This is because such problems are
more likely to appear in the interaction between the user, the data, and the application.
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Advantages Application-Based IDSs are [14]:
♦ Application-based IDSs can monitor the interaction between user and
application, which often allows them to trace unauthorized activity to individual
users.
♦ Application-based IDSs can often work in encrypted environments, since they
interface with the application at transaction endpoints, where information is
presented to users in unencrypted form.
Disadvantages Application-Based IDSs are [14]:
♦ Application-based IDSs may be more vulnerable than host-based IDSs to attacks
as the applications logs are not as well protected as the operating system audit
trails used for host-based IDSs.
♦ As Application-based IDSs often monitor events at the user level of abstraction,
they usually cannot detect Trojan Horse or other such software tampering
attacks. Therefore, it is advisable to use Application-based IDS in combination
with Host-based and/or Network-based IDSs.
3.2.3.1.2 Intrusion Detection System Analysis
“There are two primary approaches to analyzing events to detect attacks: misuse
detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection, in which the analysis targets
something known to be “bad”, is the technique used by most commercial systems.
Anomaly detection, in which the analysis looks for abnormal patterns of activity, has
been, and continues to be, the subject of a great deal of research. Anomaly detection is
used in limited form by a number of IDSs. There are strengths and weaknesses
associated with each approach, and it appears that the most effective IDSs use mostly
misuse detection methods with a smattering of anomaly detection components.” [14]
• Misuse Detection - Misuse detectors analyze system activity, looking for events or
sets of events that match a predefined pattern of events that describe a known attack.
As the patterns corresponding to known attacks are called signatures, misuse detection
is sometimes called “signature-based detection.” The most common form of misuse
detection used in commercial products specifies each pattern of events corresponding
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to an attack as a separate signature. However, there are more sophisticated approaches
to doing misuse detection (called “state-based” analysis techniques) that can leverage
a single signature to detect groups of attacks.
Advantages of Misuse Detection are [14]:
♦ Misuse detectors are very effective at detecting attacks without generating an
overwhelming number of false alarms.
♦ Misuse detectors can quickly and reliably diagnose the use of a specific attack
tool or technique. This can help security managers prioritize corrective
measures.
♦ Misuse detectors can allow system managers, regardless of their level of security
expertise, to track security problems on their systems, initiating incident
handling procedures.
Disadvantages of Misuse Detection are [14]:
♦ Misuse detectors can only detect those attacks they know about – therefore they
must be constantly updated with signatures of new attacks.
♦ Many misuse detectors are designed to use tightly defined signatures that
prevent them from detecting variants of common attacks. State-based misuse
detectors can overcome this limitation, but are not commonly used in
commercial IDSs.
• Anomaly Detection - Anomaly detectors identify abnormal unusual behavior
(anomalies) on a host or network. They function on the assumption that attacks are
different from “normal” (legitimate) activity and can therefore be detected by systems
that identify these differences. Anomaly detectors construct profiles representing
normal behavior of users, hosts, or network connections. These profiles are
constructed from historical data collected over a period of normal operation. The
detectors then collect event data and use a variety of measures to determine when
monitored activity deviates from the norm.
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The measures and techniques used in anomaly detection include [14]:
♦ Threshold detection, in which certain attributes of user and system behavior are
expressed in terms of counts, with some level established as permissible. Such
behavior attributes can include the number of files accessed by a user in a given
period of time, the number of failed attempts to login to the system, the amount
of CPU utilized by a process, etc. This level can be static or heuristic (i.e.,
designed to change with actual values observed over time)
♦ Statistical measures, both parametric, where the distribution of the profiled
attributes is assumed to fit a particular pattern, and non-parametric, where the
distribution of the profiled attributes is “learned” from a set of historical values,
observed over time.
♦ Rule-based measures, which are similar to non-parametric statistical measures
in that observed data defines acceptable usage patterns, but differs in that those
patterns are specified as rules, not numeric quantities.
♦ Other measures, including neural networks, genetic algorithms, and immune
system models. Only the first two measures are used in current commercial
IDSs.
Unfortunately, anomaly detectors and the IDSs based on them often produce a large
number of false alarms, as normal patterns of user and system behavior can vary wildly.
Despite this shortcoming, researchers assert that anomaly-based IDSs are able to detect
new attack forms, unlike signature-based IDSs that rely on matching patterns of past
attacks. Furthermore, some forms of anomaly detection produce output that can in turn
be used as information sources for misuse detectors. For example, a threshold-based
anomaly detector can generate a figure representing the “normal” number of files
accessed by a particular user. The misuse detector can use this figure as part of a
detection signature that says “if the number of files accessed by this user exceeds this
“normal” figure by ten percent, trigger an alarm.” Although some commercial IDSs
include limited forms of anomaly detection, few rely solely on this technology. The
anomaly detection that exists in commercial systems usually revolves around detecting
network or port scanning. However, anomaly detection remains an active intrusion
detection research area and may play a greater part in future IDSs.
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Advantages of Anomaly Detection are [14]:
♦ IDSs based on anomaly detection detect unusual behavior and thus have the
ability to detect symptoms of attacks without specific knowledge of details.
♦ Anomaly detectors can produce information that can in turn be used to define
signatures for misuse detectors.
Disadvantages of Anomaly Detection are [14]:
♦ Anomaly detection approaches usually produce a large number of false alarms
due to the unpredictable behaviors of users and networks.
♦ Anomaly detection approaches often require extensive “training sets” of system
event records in order to characterize normal behavior patterns.
3.2.3.1.3 Response Options for Intrusion Detection Systems
Once IDSs have obtained event information and analyzed it to find symptoms of
attacks, they generate responses. Some of these responses involve reporting results and
findings to a pre-specified location. Others involve more active automated responses.
Though researchers are tempted to underrate the importance of good response functions
in IDSs, they are actually very important. “Commercial IDSs support a wide range of
response options, often categorized as active responses, passive responses, or some
mixture of the two.” [14]
• Active Responses - Active IDS responses are automated actions taken when certain
types of intrusions are detected. There are three categories of active responses.
♦ Collect additional information – “The most innocuous, but at times most
productive, active response is to collect additional information about a suspected
attack. Each of us have probably done the equivalent of this when awakened by
a strange noise at night. The first thing one does in such a situation is to listen
more closely, searching for additional information that allows you to decide
whether you should take action. In the IDS case, this might involve increasing
the level of sensitivity of information sources (for instance, turning up the
number of events logged by an operating system audit trail, or increasing the
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sensitivity of a network monitor to capture all packets, not just those targeting a
particular port or target system.) Collecting additional information is helpful for
several reasons. The additional information collected can help resolve the
detection of the attack (assisting the system in diagnosing whether an attack did
or did not take place). This option also allows the organization to gather
information that can be used to support investigation and apprehension of the
attacker, and to support criminal and civil legal remedies.” [14]
♦ Change the Environment – Another active response is to halt an attack in
progress and then block subsequent access by the attacker. Typically, IDSs do
not have the ability to block a specific person’s access, but instead block Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses from which the attacker appears to be coming. It is very
difficult to block a determined and knowledgeable attacker, but IDSs can often
deter expert attackers or stop novice attackers by taking the following actions:
[14]
o Injecting TCP reset packets into the attacker’s connection to the victim
system, thereby terminating the connection
o Reconfiguring routers and firewalls to block packets from the attacker’s
apparent location (IP address or site),
o Reconfiguring routers and firewalls to block the network ports, protocols, or
services being used by an attacker, and
o In extreme situations, reconfiguring routers and firewalls to sever all
connections that use certain network interfaces.
♦ Take Action Against the Intruder – “Some who follow intrusion detection
discussions, especially in information warfare circles, believe that the first
option in active response is to take action against the intruder. The most
aggressive form of this response involves launching attacks against or
attempting to actively gain information about the attacker’s host or site.
However tempting it might be, this response is ill advised. Due to legal
ambiguities about civil liability, this option can represent a greater risk than the
attack it is intended to block.” [14]
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The first reason for approaching this option with a great deal of caution is that it may be
illegal. Furthermore, as many attackers use false network addresses when attacking
systems, it carries with it a high risk of causing damage to innocent Internet sites and
users. Finally, strike back can escalate the attack, provoking an attacker who originally
intended only to browse a site to take more aggressive action. Should an active
intervention and traceback of this sort be warranted (as in the case of a critical system)
human control and supervision of the process is advisable. We strongly recommend that
you obtain legal advice before pursuing any of these “strike-back” options.
• Passive Responses - Passive IDS responses provide information to system users,
relying on humans to take subsequent action based on that information. Many
commercial IDSs rely solely on passive responses.
♦ Alarms and Notifications – “Alarms and notifications are generated by IDSs to
inform users when attacks are detected. Most commercial IDSs allow users a
great deal of latitude in determining how and when alarms are generated and to
whom they are displayed. The most common form of alarm is an onscreen alert
or popup window. This is displayed on the IDS console or on other systems as
specified by the user during the configuration of the IDS. The information
provided in the alarm message varies widely, ranging from a notification that an
intrusion has taken place to extremely detailed messages outlining the IP
addresses of the source and target of the attack, the specific attack tool used to
gain access, and the outcome of the attack. Another set of options that are of
utility to large or distributed organizations are those involving remote
notification of alarms or alerts. These allow organizations to configure the IDS
so that it sends alerts to cellular phones and pagers carried by incident response
teams or system security personnel. Some products also offer email as another
notification channel. This is ill advised, as attackers often routinely monitor
email and might even block the message.” [14]
♦ SNMP Traps and Plug-ins – “Some commercial IDSs are designed to generate
alarms and alerts, reporting them to a network management system. These use
SNMP traps and messages to post alarms and alerts to central network
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management consoles, where they can be serviced by network operations
personnel. Several benefits are associated with this reporting scheme, including
the ability to adapt the entire network infrastructure to respond to a detected
attack, the ability to shift the processing load associated with an active response
to a system other than the one being targeted by the attack, and the ability to use
common communications channels.” [14]
• Reporting and Archiving Capabilities - “Many, if not all, commercial IDSs
provide capabilities to generate routine reports and other detailed information
documents. Some of these can output reports of system events and intrusions detected
over a particular reporting period (for example, a week or a month.) Some provide
statistics or logs generated by the IDS in formats suitable for inclusion in database
systems or for use in report generating.” [14]
3.2.3.2 Intrusion Detection System Examples
Some examples of intrusion detection systems and their qualifications will be explained
next. These intrusion detection systems are NIDES, Snort and Symantec Intruder Alert.
3.2.3.2.1 Next Generation Intrusion Detection System
Next Generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) is a comprehensive
intrusion-detection system that performs real-time monitoring of user activity on a set of
target system computers and detects unusual and suspicious user behavior in real time
on those target systems. NIDES runs on its own workstation and analyzes audit data
characterizing user activity collected from monitored systems to detect a variety of
suspicious user behavior.
NIDES performs two types of analysis: [15]
• NIDES’ statistical analysis maintains historical statistical profiles for each user and
raises an alarm when observed activity departs from established patterns of use for an
individual. The historical profiles are updated regularly, and older data "aged" out with
each profile update, so that NIDES adaptively learns what to expect from each user.
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This type of analysis is intended to detect intruders masquerading as legitimate users.
Statistical analysis may also detect intruders who exploit previously unknown
vulnerabilities who could not be detected by any other means. Statistical anomaly
detection can also turn up interesting and unusual events that could lead to security-
relevant discoveries upon investigation by a security officer. The statistical analysis is
customizable: several parameters and thresholds can be changed from their default
values, and specific intrusion-detection "measures" (the aspects of behavior for which
statistics are kept) can be turned on or off.
• NIDES' rule-based analysis uses rules that characterize known intrusion types to
raise an alarm if observed activity matches any of its encoded rules. This type of
analysis is intended to detect attempts to exploit known security vulnerabilities of the
monitored systems and intruders who exhibit specific patterns of behavior that are
known to be suspicious or in violation of site security policy. Observed activity that
matches any of these predefined behaviors is flagged. Unlike most competing systems,
the NIDES rulebase is customizable: new rules can be defined and compiled into the
running system, and existing rules can be turned on or off. Although NIDES comes
with a limited rulebase designed for Sun UNIX operating systems, you will want to
customize the rulebase for your particular environment and to keep it up to date with
the changing vulnerabilities of new system releases and discovered vulnerabilities of
current releases.
“The NIDES resolver screens the alarms generated by the statistical and rulebased
components before reporting them to the security officer, to avoid flooding the
security officer with redundant alarms.” [15] Alerts can be reported to the NIDES
console or to a list of email recipients. Some user-configurable filters are also
provided. For example, “Alert reporting for specific users can be turned off, if it is
known that they will be doing something unusual. Otherwise it will generate a lot of
false alarms. Although filtered alerts are not reported, they are still logged.” [15]
NIDES includes an archive facility that stores audit records, analysis results, and alerts,
and allows browsing of this archive. NIDES also includes a system monitoring facility
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that displays information on monitored systems, status of the audit data archiver, a daily
summary of system throughput, and a daily summary of alert generation.
NIDES also includes a test facility that allows a security officer to experiment with new
statistical parameter settings or new rulebase configurations before committing them to
the running NIDES. The NIDES user may construct test data sets from the audit record
archive for a specific time window and set of user names. The candidate rulebase and
statistical parameters can then be tested against these test data sets concurrent with the
running NIDES. Test results are archived for comparison.
NIDES can operate either in real time, for continuous monitoring and analysis of user
activity, or in batch mode, for periodic batch analysis of audit data. “NIDES can
monitor numerous, possibly heterogeneous, machines. The monitored systems provide
audit data to NIDES for analysis. process that runs on each monitored system converts
audit data in the monitored system's native audit record format to a generic audit data
format used by NIDES and (in real-time mode) transmits the NIDES-formatted audit
data to NIDES. NIDES receives data from multiple monitored systems and coalesces
the data into a single audit record stream for analysis. Because NIDES uses a generic
audit record format, it is easily adapted to monitor new system types by writing a simple
audit data mapping routine (mapping routines for some system types are already
available).” [15]
NIDES includes a user interface written using the MOTIF toolkit to operate under the
X-Window system. Access to the various NIDES functions is provided a pulldown
menus, point-and-click selections, and occasional text entry. An extensive multitiered
context-sensitive help system is included. NIDES also includes a comprehensive user's
manual and tutorial.
3.2.3.2.2 Snort
“Snort is a libpcap-based packet sniffer and logger that can be used as a lightweight
network intrusion detection system (NIDS).” [16] It features rules based logging to
perform content pattern matching and detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as
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buffer overflows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, and much more. Snort
has real-time alerting capability, with alerts being sent to syslog, Server Message Block
(SMB) "WinPopup" messages, or a separate "alert" file. Snort is configured using
command line switches and optional Berkeley Packet Filter commands. The detection
engine is programmed using a simple language that describes per packet tests and
actions.  Ease of use simplifies and expedites the development of new exploit detection
rules. For example, “When the IIS Showcode web exploits were revealed on the
Bugtraq mailing list, Snort rules to detect the probes were available within a few hours.”
[16]
Snort shares commonalities with both sniffers and Network IDSs. Snort decodes the
application layer of a packet and can be given rules to collect traffic that has specific
data contained within its application layer.  This allows Snort to detect many types of
hostile activity, including buffer overflows, CGI scans, or any other data in the packet
payload that can be characterized in a unique detection fingerprint.
Another Snort advantage is that its decoded output display is user friendly. Snort does
not currently lookup host names or port names while running. Snort is focused on
collecting packets as quickly as possible and processing them in the Snort detection
engine. Performing run-time host name lookup is not conducive to high performance
packet analysis.
One feature of Snort is the capability to filter traffic with Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF)
commands. “This allows traffic to be collected based upon a variety of specific packet
fields.” [16] For example, “Both tools may be instructed via BPF commands to process
TCP traffic only.” [16] Snort can utilize its flexible rules set to perform additional
functions, such as searching out and recording only those packets that have their TCP
flags set a particular way or containing web requests that amount to CGI vulnerability
probes. Snort's architecture is focused on performance, simplicity, and flexibility.  There
are three primary subsystems that make up Snort [16]:
• The packet decoder,
• The detection engine,
• The logging and alerting subsystem.
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These subsystems ride on top of the libpcap promiscuous packet sniffing library, which
provides a portable packet sniffing and filtering capability. Program configuration, rules
parsing, and data structure generation takes place before the sniffer section is initialized,
keeping the amount of per packet processing to the minimum required to achieve the
base program functionality.
Snort will run on any platform where libpcap will run.  The current version of Snort is
1.2.1, and libpcap is required to compile and run the software. Snort is known to run on
RedHat Linux 5.1/5.2/6.0, Debian Linux, MkLinux, S/Linux, HP-UX, Solaris 2.5.1 -
2.7 (x86 and Sparc), x86 Free/Net/OpenBSD, M68k NetBSD, and MacOS X
3.2.3.2.3 Intruder Alert
“Intruder Alert monitors systems and networks in real time to detect and prevent
unauthorized activity. It enables the creation of powerful, customizable intrusion
detection policies and responses  and also policy enforcement with the automatic
deployment of new policies and updated detection signatures. Intruder Alert also
delivers network-wide responses to security breaches from a central management
console.” [17]
Symantec Intruder Alert 3.6 is a host-based, real-time intrusion monitoring system that
detects unauthorized activity and security breaches and responds automatically. If
Intruder Alert detects a threat, an alarm is sounded or other countermeasures are taken
according to pre-established security policies in order to prevent information loss or
theft. From a central console, administrators can create, update, and deploy policies and
securely collect and archive audit logs for incident analysis, all while maintaining the
availability and integrity of systems. “As a complement to firewalls and other access
controls, Intruder Alert enables the development of precautionary security policies that
prevent expert hackers or authorized users with malicious intent from misusing systems,
applications, and data. Intruder Alert provides complete control over systems with
policy-based management that determines which systems and activities to monitor and
what actions to take, as well as with real-time intrusion detection reports for both host
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and network components. Administrative wizards perform many routine tasks and silent
installation and remote tune-up capabilities make it easy to deploy and maintain the
system.” [17]
Symantec Intruder Alert 3.6 includes specialized software agents that support server
platforms running Windows NT, most commercial versions of UNIX, and Novell
NetWare. It can also be configured to monitor Web or database applications running on
servers.
3.2.3.3 Intrusion Detection Systems and GASSP Principles
Some of the Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) can be used in
developing and using in detection process of attacks and providing alerts to the security
administrator of the organizations. The relevant GASSP principles are Timeliness
Pervasive Principle, and Accountability Broad Functional Principle. Also a detailed
security principle about intrusion detection systems can be formed.
All parts of the organizations measures should act in a timely manner to prevent and
avoid the attacks and intrusions to be made to the organization’s information system.
Intrusion detection systems should detect the intrusions as soon as possible, rise alarms
and also try to avoid the attack to give harm to the system. Also management should
hold all the parts of the system accountable for their access and use of information.
Intrusion detection systems hold the audits of the system and so all the additions,
modifications, deletions etc. to the system and their accountable users can be logged and
known by the system.
3.2.3.3.1 Developed Detailed Security Principle About Intrusion Detection Systems
The principle can be stated as, “Use intrusion detection systems in the process of
detecting all the potential attacks and intrusions to the system that an attacker is
attempting to give harm or to get unauthorized information.” Intrusion detection
systems are able to detect the intrusions by auditing the system and matching the audits
with known intrusion scenarios and also some types of them with statistical analysis of
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the audits and user profiles. As seen above intrusion detection systems must used in
detecting the intrusions to the systems, which may be dangerous and harmful for the
information system.
3.2.4 Integrity Checkers
Integrity checkers resides in the recovery sub-layer of the intrusion management
systems and also in the detection sub-layer of intrusion management architecture. File
Integrity Checkers are another class of security tools that complement intrusion
detection systems. Integrity checking tools detect and notify system administrators of
changed, added, or deleted files in some meaningful and useful manner. Integrity
analysis focuses on whether some aspect of a file or object has been altered. This often
includes file and directory attributes, content and data streams. Integrity analysis often
utilizes strong cryptographic mechanisms, called message digest (or hash) algorithms,
which can recognize even subtle changes. They utilize message digest or other
cryptographic checksums for critical files and objects, comparing them to reference
values, and flagging differences or changes.
The use of cryptographic checksums is important, as attackers often alter system files, at
three stages of the attack. “First, they alter system files as the goal of the attack (e.g.,
Trojan Horse placement), second, they attempt to leave back doors in the system
through which they can reenter the system at a later time, and finally, they attempt to
cover their tracks so that system owners will be unaware of the attack.” [14]
Although File Integrity Checkers are most often used to determine whether attackers
have altered system files or executables, they can also help determine whether vendor-
supplied bug patches or other desired changes have been applied to system binaries.
They are extremely valuable to those conducting a forensic examination of systems that
have been attacked, as they allow quick and reliable diagnosis of the footprint of an
attack. This enables system managers to optimize the restoration of service after
incidents occur.
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Any successful attack where files were altered, network packet grabbers were left
behind, or root-kits were deployed will be detected regardless of whether or not the
attack was detected by signature or statistical analysis.
Because current implementations tend to work in batch mode, they are not conducive to
real-time response. And also meaningfully reporting changed files is difficult, because
most files are expected to change: system log files are written to, program sources are
updated, and documents are revised.
3.2.4.1 Integrity Checker Examples
Some examples integrity checkers and their qualifications will be explained next. These
integrity checkers are Tripwire, Samhain, CHECK.
3.2.4.1.1 Tripwire
Tripwire is an integrity checking program written for Unix environments. It has released
first in November 2, 1992 by Gene Kim and Dr. Eugene Spafford (of the COAST
laboratory at Perdue University) [18]. It is portable, scalable, configurable, and secure.
Tripwire is portable because, it is written in standard K&R C, adhering to POSIX
standards whenever possible. It can run on [18]:
• NT 4.0
• Solaris (Intel and SPARC) 2.6 and 7.0
• IBM AIX 4.2 and 4.3
• HP-UX 10.20 and 11.0
• SGI IRIX 6.5
• Linux
Tripwire is determined as scalable because it has a preprocessing language. Its
configuration and database files can be read from any file descriptors open at the time of
Tripwire invocation. It supports UNIX style pipes.
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Tripwire’s configuration files may be shared between multiple machines. Each entry
includes a selection-mask describing which file (inode) attributes can change without
being reported. It includes general templates for quick file classification. These are [18]:
• read-only files The access timestamp is ignored.
• log files Changes to file size, access and modification timestamps, and signatures are
ignored.
• growing log files Same as log files except only increasing file sizes are ignored
• ignore nothing and ignore everything
Tripwire is recommends storage of database on read-only media. Database contains on
information that could aid an intruder in compromising the integrity checking scheme.
The signature spoofing reduced by choice of message digest algorithm. It is self-
contained and it may be run without privilege. It reports, but it does not effect changes.
Tripwire can be used in applications like [18]:
• Intrusion Detection.
• Damage Assessment and Recovery
• Forensics
• Policy Compliance
• Software Verification.
It includes signature functions of CRC-32, HAVAL, MD5, and SHA.
3.2.4.1.2 Samhain
“Samhain is a file system integrity and intrusion detection tool that allows to trace what
changes have occurred on a file system, when these changes have occurred, and who
was logged into the system in the respective time.” [19]
Samhain is designed for intuitive configuration and tamper-resistance, and can be
configured as a client/server application to monitor many hosts on a network from a
single central location. Samhain uses a database of file signatures, including a
cryptographic checksum, compares the current state of files and directories against this
database, identifies changes, and reports on them if a policy violation is detected.
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“Samhain can be run as a daemon process, and is designed to leave a recognizable trace
if the daemon is stopped and restarted.” [19] For networks, samhain can be used as a
client/server system with a central log server.  Database and configuration files can be
stored on the server, and downloaded by clients at startup. Strong authentication is used
for client/server TCP/IP connections. For single-host usage, samhain supports logging
to a cryptographically signed log file, to e-mail, syslog, and the console. In addition,
external scripts may be invoked e.g. for paging. The configuration file and the database
can be signed with PGP, and thus do not need to be on write-only media.
For usage on a single host, Samhain can be compiled without client/server code, to
produce a smaller executable. To prevent modification of existing records, the local log
file entries are signed using a hash chain, with an original key generated at random. The
image of the running process only holds the current key. Keys used for signing past
entries are lost - they can only be computed if the original key is known. This original
key is emailed to the designated recipient, transparently encrypted with a one-time pad.
Only someone who has catched the email and has access to the executable may modify
the log file. Both the configuration file and database can be signed by PGP/GnuPG to
prevent tampering. Alternatively, Samhain can compute the checksums of both and
report them, thus allowing verifying their integrity. To be able to trace modifications of
the file system even if an intruder has deleted the database, it is probably a good idea to
have a secure backup of the database.
“Samhain is a system that has been designed to facilitate secure and easy monitoring of
multiple hosts in a network. It consists of monitoring daemon processes running on
individual hosts, and (optionally) a central log server collecting reports from these
daemons via TCP/IP connections.” [19]
Strong authentication is used to prevent uploading of fake messages to the server. With
each client, the server will first engage in a protocol for authentication of the client and
exchange of a session key. Connections from unregistered hosts are dropped
immediately, and connections from registered hosts are dropped if the client cannot
successfully complete the authentication protocol. Once the session key is established,
the client will use it to sign its messages. On receipt of a message, the server will check
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the signature of the client, then remove it and add its own signature when writing to the
log file.
Both the configuration file and database can be stored centrally on the server side, and
downloaded by the client on startup. A rapid deployment system allows fast, secure and
easy installation on multiple hosts. To facilitate the construction of a single
configuration file for all hosts on the network, samhain allows conditionals based on
hostname, machine, and operating system in the configuration file. Conditionals may be
nested, negated, and may use regular expressions.
“Samhain can be also compiled with support for a stealth mode of operation, meaning
that the program can be run without an obvious trace of its presence on disk.” [19]
While it is trivial to run a program under a different name, the presence of the program
can still be inferred e.g. from the presence of configuration files, or by searching for
strings embedded within the executables on disk. Samhain offers the following options
[19]:
• printable strings in the executable, and in the log and database files, can obfuscated,
such that they look like binary data,
• command-line parsing can be disabled,
• configuration data can be hidden in an image file by steganography (a utility program
for steganography is included), and
• the executable can be packed using compression and encryption.
The database and log file may be hidden by appending them to an already existing
image. As the image will display normally, and the appended data are at first sight
indistinguishable from binary (image) data, some effort would be required to find them.
3.2.4.1.3 Check
“CHECK is a utility which can help detecting viruses. It's not a virus scanner - it will
not scan for viruses in the memory or on the disks. It will try to detect suspicious things
like modified memory, files, boot records, interrupts, etc. instead.” [20]
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CHECK tests the integrity of the [20]:
• Master Boot Record
• Partition Tables
• Boot Sectors
• Interrupts
• Memory
• Upper Memory
• BIOS
• CMOS
• Files (CRC and code checks)
CHECK uses CRC algorithms for checksums. It uses the same polynoms as the McAfee
VALIDATE and SCANV programs. The data  is stored  in a text file, so you can view it
simply each line in the file consists of the filename, the both checksums and the file
size.
It will detect modifications in files. A virus cannot exist without certain instructions.
CHECK checks the code of the executables for certain modified / new instructions. This
method is not as reliable as the validation, but it's much faster and gives you additional
security.  Note that this method will discover viruses, but possibly not destroyed or
modified data.
CHECK can also check the Master Boot Record of the harddisk. Each physical harddisk
has only one MBR.  The MBR contains the code to load the boot sector of the active
(the bootable) partition and the partition table. There can be more than one partition
table on the harddisk if extended partitions have been used. CHECK will save all
partition tables.
“If CHECK detects that an executable file was modified, and if it is sure that you this
file have not been modified by authorized parties (installing a new version, re-compiling
the sources, etc.) deleting the file is recommended.” [20] A good virus scanner could
recognize and remove the virus (if it's a known virus) but possibly could not be able to
restore the file to its original state. It can happen that a scanner thinks to have
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recognized one virus but the file is infected with a different virus or even a new version
of the same virus and this can lead to some serious problems (like, the virus  remains in
the file). To keep backups of all the files is reasonable for these reasons [20]. Some
programs are able to modify itself or other executables - for example to write
configuration data, some antivirus programs add data to the files, etc [20].
3.2.4.2 Integrity Checkers and GASSP Principles
Some of the Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP) can be used in
developing and using integrity checkers in detection process of attacks, and system
integrity checks. The relevant GASSP principle is System Integrity Broad Functional
Principle. This principle of GASSP can be used in integrity checking process of the
information systems` of an organization. Also a detailed security principle can be
formed for integrity checkers.
Management shall ensure that all properties of systems and applications that are
essential to or relied upon to support the organization’s mission are established,
preserved, and safeguarded. To be able to understand if there is an intrusion to the
information system an integrity check of the system and files should be made. In this
process integrity checkers plays an important role. And in this process System Integrity
Broad Functional Process can give a good guidance.
3.2.4.2.1 Developed Detailed Security Principle About Integrity Checkers
The principle can be stated as, “Use integrity checker programs in the process of
checking the integrity of the computer system against changes, adding, or deleting
files.” Integrity analysis focuses on whether some aspect of a file or object has been
altered. The attacks, which are successful and give harm to the system and files can be
revealed by checking the modifications, adding or deleting processes acted on the files.
By doing integrity check, attacks to the integrity of the system can be detected and the
harms may be recovered. So, integrity checkers may be used in recovery layer of the
intrusion management systems.
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3.3 Developed Detailed Security Principles In The Thesis Work
The developed detailed security principles about the tools of Intrusion Management
Systems are stated in the following subsections. A cross-impact matrix related to
developed principles to the pervasive and broad functional principles (Figure 3.1) is also
included at the end of this section.
3.3.1 Developed Detailed Security Principle About Firewalls
The principle can be stated as “Use firewalls in the process of preventing the attacks
coming from outside to the organization’s information system.” Firewalls are able to
prevent the types of attacks, which are possible for an organization’s network by
denying the connections to the system in regard to their configurations. As seen above
firewalls are used in avoidance layer of the intrusion management systems for
preventing the system from the attacks. The GASSP principles about this process’ point
out the firewalls.
3.3.2  Developed Detailed Security Principle About Vulnerability Scanners
The principle can be stated as “Use vulnerability scanner programs in the process of
checking all of the potential methods that an attacker might use to tamper with an
organization’s network.” Vulnerability scanners are able to determine the types of
attacks, which are possible for an organization’s network, by analyzing network’s
software types and software configurations. Both known and unknown vulnerabilities
can be checked by many of the vulnerability scanners. As indicated, above vulnerability
scanners are used in vulnerability assessment process of the information systems and
they play an important role in this process. The GASSP principles about this process’
point out the vulnerability scanner tools and vulnerability scanning.
3.3.3 Developed Detailed Security Principle About Intrusion Detection Systems
The principle can be stated as “Use intrusion detection systems in the process of
detecting all the potential attacks and intrusions to the system that an attacker is
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attempting to give harm or to get unauthorized information.” Intrusion detection
systems are able to detect the intrusions by auditing the system and matching the audits
with known intrusion scenarios and also some types of them with statistical analysis of
the audits and user profiles. Intrusion detection systems must used in detecting the
intrusions to the systems, which may be dangerous and harmful for the information
system.
3.3.4 Developed Detailed Security Principle About Integrity Checkers
The principle can be stated as “Use integrity checker programs in the process of
checking the integrity of the computer system against changes, adding, or deleting
files.” Integrity analysis focuses on whether some aspect of a file or object has been
altered. The attacks - which are successful and give harm to the system and files - can
be revealed by checking the modifications, adding, or deleting processes acted on the
files. By doing integrity check, attacks to the integrity of the system can be detected and
the loss may be recovered. So, integrity checkers may be used in recovery layer of the
intrusion management systems.
3.3.5 Cross Impact Matrix
The following matrix in Figure 3.1 presents the relationship of the Developed Detailed
Security Principles (DSP) and the Pervasive (PP) and Broad Functional (BFP)
Principles of GASSP. It indicates the GASSP principle that is used in developing the
detailed security principles about the tools of Intrusion Management Systems. For
example, the Detailed Security Principle about Intrusion Detection Systems is
developed by using Timeliness Pervasive Principle (PP-7) and Accountability Broad
Functional Principle (BFP-3).
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Figure 3.1: Cross-Impact Matrix Relating to DSP’s to PP’s and BFP’s.
GASSP
Principles
DSP for
Firewalls
DSP for
Vulnerability
Scanners
DSP for
Intrusion
Detection
Systems
DSP for
Integrity
Checkers
PP-1
PP-2
PP-3
PP-4
PP-5
PP-6
PP-7 X
PP-8 X
PP-9
BFP-1
BFP-2
BFP-3 X
BFP-4
BFP-5
BFP-6
BFP-7 X
BFP-8
BFP-9 X
BFP-10 X
BFP-11 X
BFP-12 X X
BFP-13
BFP-14
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
An Intrusion Management System is a set of integrated tools necessary to avoid
intrusions. If avoidance measures taken by the system for intrusions are not successful
an intrusion management system is expected to detect the intrusion attempts and
intrusions. Moreover, an intrusion management system is responsible for recovering the
information system safely to its operating status after an intrusion. Such an intrusion
management system can be said successful only if it is truly configured and if it can
patch all the vulnerable points of the information system. The security provided by the
Intrusion Management Systems should also be reviewed continuously by a security
review program. Therefore, a successful security review program for the Intrusion
Management Systems must be implemented and developed. To be able to develop such
a program, some Detailed Security Principles with the guidance of Generally Accepted
System Security Principles (GASSP), have been developed in this thesis work.
Intrusion Management Systems have a four layer architecture. These layers are
avoidance, assurance, detection and recovery layers. Each of the tools, which have been
examined and for which principles that have been developed, belongs to one of the four
layers of Intrusion Management System model. The tools are firewalls for avoidance
layer, vulnerability scanners for assurance layer, intrusion detection systems for
detection layer and integrity checkers for recovery layer of Intrusion Management
systems. Moreover, some commercial examples of these tools have been examined and
their qualifications have been explained in the thesis. These tools are Checkpoint
Firewall-1, Gauntlet Firewall 6.0, and T-Rex Security Suit for firewalls, eEye Retina,
Languard, and Nessus for Vulnerability Scanners, Next Generation Intrusion Detection
Expert System (NIDES), Snort and Intruder Alert for intrusion detection systems and
Tripwire, Samhain, and Check for Integrity Checker tools.
Principles are the building blocks of standards and procedures and they play an
important role in developing standards and procedures. The principles that have been
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developed in this thesis work can be used as a reference in developing some standards
for Intrusion Management System tools. In addition, according to the developed
principles in this thesis, new tools can be developed and used in the security review job
of Intrusion Management Systems.
The developed principles in this thesis work do not give exact standards and procedures
to develop such Intrusion Management System tools, but they give a guidance to the
people who want to develop such standards for these tools. The developed principles
state which tools can be used in which layer of the Intrusion Management process. Also,
the developed principles state that which tool can be used in which process and also the
task of this tool in the intrusion management process. Therefore, this thesis work
provides a reference to the information security practitioners in the security review job
of the Intrusion Management Systems. By using this reference, the avoidance of the
intrusions to the information system can be handled more successfully and also the
sufficiency of the measures taken can be assured, and also detection of the successful
intrusion attempts and recovery of the system can be done better.
Also, as a future work of this thesis work, standards about the tools of Intrusion
Management Systems can be developed according to the Detailed Security Principles
developed in this thesis work. A computer software, that provides the necessary detailed
security principles according to the Generally Accepted System Security Principles can
also be developed as a future work as well.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS
Generally Accepted
GASSP are conventional--that is, they become “generally accepted” by agreement
(often tacit agreement) rather than formal derivation from a set of postulates or basic
concepts.  The principles have been developed on the basis of experience, reason,
custom, usage, and, to a significant extent, practical necessity.  The sources of
established information security principles are generally the following [5]:
• Pronouncements of an authoritative body (to be established), as appropriate, to
establish information security principles.
• Pronouncements of bodies composed of expert information security practitioners that
follow a due process procedure, including broad distribution of proposed information
security principles for public comment, for the intended purpose of establishing
information security principles or describing existing practices that are generally
accepted.  This includes information security audit guides and statements of position.
• Practices or pronouncements that are generally accepted because they represent
prevalent practice in a particular industry or the knowledgeable application to specific
circumstance of pronouncements.  This includes interpretations and practices that are
widely recognized and prevalent in the industry.
• Other information security literature including pronouncements of other professional
associations or regulatory agencies and information security textbooks and articles.
“The concept of generally accepted is to be distinguished from the concept of
universally accepted.  This distinction is made to address the case that all principles may
have exceptions.  For example, a library system may insist that the card catalog system
have no accountability to preserve the privacy of the user.  A process will be provided
for use when it is deemed necessary to deviate from the published GASSP.” [5]
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Generally Accepted System Security Principles (GASSP)
“Generally Accepted System Security Principles” incorporate the consensus, at a
particular time, as to the principles, standards, conventions, and mechanisms that
information security practitioners should employ, that information processing products
should provide, and that information owners should acknowledge to ensure the security
of information and information systems.
“GASSP relates to physical, technical and administrative information security and
encompasses pervasive, broad functional, and detailed security principles.  GASSP
nomenclature considers the terms policy, rules, procedures, and practices to relate to the
organizational implementation of security.  Information technology (IT) changes
rapidly, and GASSP are expected to evolve accordingly.  Consensus as to accepted
information security principles is achieved first within the GASSP Committee followed
by international IT community review.” [5]
Information
“The term “information” applies to any storage, communication, or receipt of
knowledge, such as fact, data, or opinions, including numerical, graphic, or narrative
forms, whether oral or maintained in any medium.” [5]
Information System
“The term “information system” describes the organized collection, processing,
transmission, and dissemination or information in accordance with defined procedures,
whether automated or manual.” [5]
Information Security Principles
The term “information security principles” is used in its broadest context. It includes
principles, standards, conventions and mechanisms.  Three categories (pervasive, broad
functional, and detailed) are used to collect, discuss, and organize security principles.
“The broad functional and detailed security principles are divided into principles for
information security practitioners and information processing products.” [5]
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“GASSP will support information security professional certification, information
security audit, and information technology product development from an information
security perspective.  GASSP will also provide authoritative guidance to the
information security practitioners, enabling them to establish and maintain their
credibility with management” [5]
System
“The term “system” is used as an umbrella term for the hardware, software, physical,
administrative, and organizational issues that need to be considered when addressing the
security of an organization's information resources.  It implies that the GASSP address
the broadest definition of information security.  The term System is intended to be
equivalent in scope of the terms Information Technology (IT), Automated Information
System (AIS), Automated Data Processing Element (ADPE), etc.” [5]
Activity
“Instantiations of the data source that are identified by the analyzer as being of interest
to the security administrator. Examples of this include (but are not limited to) network
sessions, user activity, and application events. Activity can range from extremely
serious occurrences (such as an unequivocally malicious attack) to less serious
occurrences (such as unusual user activity that’s worth a further look).” [13]
Agent
“The Intrusion Detection component that periodically collects data from the data source,
sometimes performing some analysis or organization of the data. Also known as
sensor.” [13]
Analyzer
“The Intrusion Detection component that analyzes the data collected by the sensor for
signs of unauthorized or undesired activity or for events that might be of interest to the
security administrator.” [13]
Audit Log
“The log of system events and activities generated by the operating system.” [13]
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Data Source
“The raw information that an intrusion detection system uses to detect unauthorized or
undesired activity. Common data sources include (but are not limited to) raw network
packets, operating system audit logs, application audit logs, and system-generated
checksum data.” [13]
Event
“A notification from an analyzer to the security administrator a signature has triggered.
An event typically contains information about the activity that triggered the signature,
as well as the specifics of the occurrence.” [13]
File Assessment
“A technology in which message digest hashing algorithms are used to render files and
directories tamper evident.” [13]
Incident Handling
“The part of the Security Management Process concerning the investigation and
resolution of security incidents that occur and are detected. Also known as incident
response.” [13]
Intrusion Detection
“The technology concerned with monitoring computer systems in order to recognize
signs of intrusions or policy violations.” [13]
Manager
“The Intrusion Detection component from which the security administrator manages the
various components of the ID system. Management functions typically include (but are
not limited to) sensor configuration, analyzer configuration, event notification
management, data consolidation, and reporting.” [13]
Message Digest Algorithms
“Specialized cryptographic algorithms that are used to render files tamper-evident. The
nature of message digest algorithms dictates that if an input data file is changed in any
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way, the checksum that is calculated from that data file value calculated will change.
Furthermore, a small change in the input data file will result in a large difference in the
result.” [13]
Response
“The actions that an analyzer takes when a signature is triggered. Sending an event
notification to the security administrator is a very common response. Other responses
include (but are not limited to) logging the activity, recording the raw data (from the
data source) that caused the signature to trigger, terminating a network, user, or
application session, or altering network or system access controls.” [13]
Scanning
“The technology concerned with scanning computer systems and networks in order to
find security vulnerabilities. Also known as vulnerability assessment.” [13]
Security Administrator
“The human with responsibility for the successful deployment and operation of the
intrusion detection system. This person may ultimately charged with responsibility for
the defense of the network. In some organizations, the security administrator is
associated with the network or systems administration groups. In other organizations,
it’s an independent position.” [13]
Sensor
“The Intrusion Detection component that periodically collects data from the data source.
Also known as agent.” [13]
Signature
“A rule used by the analyzer to identify interesting activity to the security administrator.
Signatures are the mechanism by which ID systems detect intrusions.” [13]
System Log
“The log of system events and activities, generated by a system process. The system log
is typically at a greater degree of abstraction than the operating system audit log.” [13]
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Vulnerability Assessment
“The technology concerned with scanning computer systems and networks in order to
find security vulnerabilities. Also known as scanning.” [13]
